


## Assignment #3

Due: Monday, February 28th, 2000.

**Problem 1** Merkle hash trees.

Merkle suggested a parallelizable method for constructing hash functions out of compression functions. Let  $f$  be a compression function that takes two 512 bit blocks and outputs one 512 bit block. To hash a message  $M$  one uses the following tree construction:



Prove that if one can find a collision for the resulting hash function then one can find collisions for the compression function.

**Problem 2** In this problem we explore the different ways of constructing a MAC out of a non-keyed hash function. Let  $h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^b$  be a hash function constructed by iterating a collision resistant compression function using the Merkle-Damgård construction.

1. Show that defining  $MAC_k(M) = h(k \parallel M)$  results in an insecure MAC. That is, show that given a valid text/MAC pair  $(M, H)$  one can efficiently construct another valid text/MAC pair  $(M', H')$  without knowing the key  $k$ .
2. Recall that in the Merkle-Damgård iterated construction one uses a fixed Initial Value  $IV$  as the initial chaining variable. Show that setting the  $IV$  to be the secret key  $k$  results in an insecure MAC.

3. Consider the MAC defined by  $MAC_k(M) = h(M \parallel k)$ . Show that in expected time  $O(2^{b/2})$  it is possible to construct two messages  $M$  and  $M'$  such that given  $MAC_k(M)$  it is possible to construct  $MAC_k(M')$  without knowing the key  $k$ .
4. Give a short high level argument to show why the envelope method for constructing a MAC out of a hash function produces a secure MAC.

**Problem 3** Rabin suggested a signature scheme very similar to RSA signatures. In its simplest form, the public key is a product of two large primes  $N = pq$  and the private key is  $p$  and  $q$ . The signature  $S$  of a message  $M \in \mathbb{Z}_N$  is the square root of  $M$  modulo  $N$ . For simplicity, assume that the messages  $M$  being signed are always quadratic residues modulo  $N$ . To verify the signature, simply check that  $S^2 = M \pmod N$ . Note that we did not include any hashing of  $M$  prior to signing. Show that a chosen message attack on the scheme can result in a total break. More precisely, if an attacker can get Alice to sign messages chosen by the attacker then the attacker can factor  $N$ .

**Hint:** recall that a quadratic residue modulo  $N = pq$  has four square roots in  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ . First show that there are two square roots of  $M$  that enable the attacker to factor  $N$  (use the fact that gcd's are easy to compute). Then show how using a chosen message attack the attacker can get a hold of such a pair of square roots. Note that proper hashing prior to signing prevents this attacks.

**Problem 4** Suppose Alice and Bob share a secret key  $k$ . A simple proposal for a MAC algorithm on fixed length messages is as follows: given a message  $M$  do: (1) compute 128 different parity bits of  $M$  (i.e. compute the parity of 128 different subsets of the bits of  $M$ ), and (2) DES encrypt the resulting 128-bit checksum using  $k$ . Naively, one could argue that without knowing  $k$  an attacker cannot compute the MAC of a message  $M$ . Show that this proposal is flawed. Note that the algorithm for computing the 128-bit checksum is public.

Hint: show that an attacker can carry out an existential forgery given one valid message/MAC pair. Use linear algebra modulo 2.

**Extra Credit** Recall that in the ElGamal signature scheme, a signature is of the form  $(a, b)$  where  $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $a$  is an integer. In lecture, we glossed over the fact that  $a$  is required to be less than  $p$ . Show that without this restriction, one can forge signatures for any message.

**Hint:** ElGamal says to find  $(a, b)$  such that  $y^a a^b = g^M$ . First show how to find  $(b, c, d)$  such that  $y^d c^b = g^M$ .]