


Assignment #1

Due: Wednesday, Jan. 28th, 2004.

Problem 1 Let E, D be the encryption/decryption algorithms of a certain block cipher. Consider the following chaining method for double DES like encryption:



The secret key is a triple (k, k_1, k_2) where k is as long as E 's block size (64 bits for DES) and k_1, k_2 are as long as E 's key size (56 bits for DES). For example, when E is DES the total key size is $64+56+56 = 176$ bits.

- Describe the decryption circuit for this system.
- Show that using two short chosen ciphertext decryption queries an attacker can recover the full key (k, k_1, k_2) in approximately the time it takes to run algorithm D 2^ℓ times (i.e. the attack running time should be $O(2^\ell \text{time}(D))$). Here ℓ is the block cipher's key-length (56 bits for DES). Your attack shows that this system can be broken much faster than exhaustive search.

Hint: Consider the two decryption queries $\langle C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4 \rangle$ and $\langle C'_1, C_2, C'_3, C_4 \rangle$ where C_1, \dots, C_4 and C'_1, C'_3 are random ciphertext blocks.

Problem 2 Data compression is often used in data storage or transmission. Suppose you want to use data compression in conjunction with encryption. Does it make more sense to

- Compress the data and then encrypt the result, or
- Encrypt the data and then compress the result.

Justify your answer.

Problem 3 Before DESX was invented, the researchers at RSA Labs came up with DESV and DESW, defined by

$$\begin{aligned} DESV_{kk_1}(M) &= DES_k(M) \oplus k_1 \text{ and} \\ DESW_{kk_1}(M) &= DES_k(M \oplus k_1) \end{aligned}$$

As with DESX, $|k| = 56$ and $|k_1| = 64$. Show that both these proposals do not increase the work needed to break the cryptosystem using brute-force key search. That is, show how to break these schemes using on the order of 2^{56} DES encryptions/decryptions. You may assume that you have a moderate number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, $C_i = DES\{V/W\}_{kk_1}(M_i)$.

Problem 4 The movie industry wants to protect digital content distributed on DVD's. We study one possible approach. Suppose there are at most a total of n DVD players in the world (e.g. $n = 2^{32}$). We view these n players as the leaves of a binary tree of height $\log_2 n$. Each node v_i in this binary tree contains an AES key K_i . These keys are kept secret from consumers and are fixed for all time. At manufacturing time each DVD player is assigned a serial number $i \in [0, n - 1]$. Consider the set S_i of $\log_2 n$ nodes along the path from the root to leaf number i in the binary tree. The manufacturer of the DVD player embeds in player number i the $\log_2 n$ keys associated with the nodes in S_i . In this way each DVD player ships with $\log_2 n$ keys embedded in it (these keys are supposedly inaccessible to consumers). A DVD movie M is encrypted as

$$DVD = \underbrace{E_{K_{root}}(K)}_{\text{header}} \parallel \underbrace{E_K(M)}_{\text{body}}$$

where K is some random AES key called a content-key. Since all DVD players have the key K_{root} all players can decrypt the movie M . We refer to $E_{K_{root}}(K)$ as the header and $E_K(M)$ as the body. In what follows the DVD header may contain multiple ciphertexts where each ciphertext is the encryption of the content-key K under some key K_i in the binary tree.

- a. Suppose the $\log_2 n$ keys embedded in DVD player number r are exposed by hackers and published on the Internet (say in a program like DeCSS). Show that when the movie industry is about to distribute a new DVD movie they can encrypt the contents of the DVD using a header of size $\log_2 n$ so that all DVD players can decrypt the movie except for player number r . In effect, the movie industry disables player number r .
Hint: the header will contain $\log_2 n$ ciphertexts where each ciphertext is the encryption of the content-key K under certain $\log_2 n$ keys from the binary tree.
- b. Suppose the keys embedded in k DVD players $R = \{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$ are exposed by hackers. Show that the movie industry can encrypt the contents of a new DVD using a header of size $O(k \log n)$ so that all players can decrypt the movie except for the players in R . You have just shown that all hacked players can be disabled without affecting other consumers.

Problem 5 Given a cryptosystem E_k , define the randomized cryptosystem F_k by

$$F_k(M) = (E_k(R), R \oplus M),$$

where R is a random bit string of the same size as the message. That is, the output of $F_k(M)$ is the encryption of a random one-time pad along with the original message XORed with the random pad. A new independent random pad R is chosen for every encryption.

We consider two attack models. The goal of both models is to reconstruct the actual secret key k (this is a very strong goal – one might be able to decrypt messages without ever learning k).

- In the key-reconstruction chosen plaintext attack (KR-CPA), the adversary is allowed to generate q strings M_1, M_2, \dots, M_q and for each M_i learn a corresponding ciphertext.
- In the key-reconstruction random plaintext attack (KR-RPA), the adversary is given q random plaintext/ciphertext pairs.


Note that for the case of F_k the opponent has no control over the random pad R used in the creation of the given plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Clearly a KR-CPA attack gives the attacker

more power than a KR-RPA attack. Consequently, it is harder to build cryptosystems that are secure against KR-CPA.

Prove that if E_k is secure against KR-RPA attacks then F_k is secure against KR – CPA attacks.

Hint: It is easiest to show the contrapositive. Given an algorithm A that executes a successful KR – CPA attack against F_k , construct an algorithm B (using A as a “subroutine”) that executes a successful KR – RPA attack against E_k . First, define precisely what algorithm A takes as input, what queries it makes, and what it produces as output. Do the same for B . Then construct an algorithm B that runs A on a certain input and properly answers all of A ’s queries. Show that the output produced by A enables B to complete the KR – RPA attack against E_k .

Problem 6 Consider the following CSS-like pseudo random generator. Assume the generator is used as a stream cipher to encrypt the contents of a DVD.



The secret key is 40 bits. The top LFSR is initialized with $1||k_1$ where k_1 is the left most 16 bits of the key. The bottom LFSR is initialized with $1||k_2$ where k_2 is the right most 24 bits of the key. The output of the two LFSR’s is Xored and the resulting bit stream is the pseudo random sequence used to encrypt the plaintext. Show that an attacker who is only given the initial 100 bits of output of this generator can produce the rest of the output sequence in time approximately 2^{20} .

Your attack is much faster than an exhaustive search attack that takes time 2^{40} to produce the rest of the output sequence. An attack that runs in time 2^{20} only takes a few milliseconds on a modern machine implying that the resulting stream cipher is completely insecure once a few bits of a plaintext/ciphertext pair are known.

Hint: Do an exhaustive search on all 2^{17} possible states of the top LFSR and try to deduce the state of the bottom LFSR.