Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes
Authors: D. Boneh and M. Zhandry
Abstract:
We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are
existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message
attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s
ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its
choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient
for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably
harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a
variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum
secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing
that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct
a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise
independent family is sufficient for one-time security.
Reference:
In proc. of Eurocrypt 2013, LNCS 7881, pp. 592-608.
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