Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Gil Segev, Weizmann Institute of Science
Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is traditionally concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture side-channel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. In light of the prevalence of side-channel attacks there have been several recent attempts to model such attacks, and to construct cryptographic schemes that are secure even against a wide range of side-channnel attacks. In this talk I will describe recent developments in the area that are inspired by the "cold boot attacks" of Halderman et al. (Usenix Security 2008), and by the framework for modelling key-leakage attacks suggested by Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC '09) in which adversarially chosen functions of the secret key are leaked to the attacker. In particular, I will present a new and simple construction of a public-key cryptosystem that is resilient to leakage of almost all the secret key, as well as a generic method for constructing leakage-resilient cryptosystems that can be based on a variety of number-theoretic assumptions. Joint work with Moni Naor.