Cryptography Robust against Side Channel Attacks
Yael Tauman Kalai
Traditionally, cryptographers assume that the secret keys are totally hidden from the adversary. However, in reality there are various real-world physical attacks, including, timing and power attacks, which allow an adversary to (continually) leak information about the secret keys. In addition, there are various attacks, including heat and EM radiation attacks, which allow an adversary to (continually) tamper with the secret keys. Recently, there has been a large and growing body of work, which tries to secure cryptographic systems against such, so called, side-channel attacks. In this talk, I will review some of these results, and focus on two recent results, which show how to construct encryption and signature schemes that are secure even against an adversary that continually leaks (bounded) information about the secret key, and continually tampers with the secret key. These results are based on joint work with Zvika Brakerski, Jonathan Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and on joint work with Bhavana Kanukurthi and Amit Sahai.