Problem 1. The trouble with compression. Let \((E, D)\) be a semantically secure cipher that operates on messages in \(\{0, 1\}^{\leq n}\) (i.e. messages whose length is at most \(n\) bits). Suppose that the ciphertext output by the encryption algorithm is exactly 128 bits longer than the input plaintext. To reduce ciphertext size, there is a strong desire to combine encryption with lossless compression. We can think of compression as a function from \(\{0, 1\}^{\leq n}\) to \(\{0, 1\}^{\leq n}\) where, for some messages, the output is shorter than the input. As always, the compression algorithm is publicly known to everyone.

a. Compress-then-encrypt: Suppose the encryptor compresses the plaintext message \(m\) before passing it to the encryption algorithm \(E\). Some \(n\)-bit messages compress well, while other messages do not compress at all. Show that the resulting system is not semantically secure by exhibiting a semantic security adversary that obtains advantage close to 1.

b. Encrypt-then-compress: Suppose that instead, the encryptor applies compression to the output of algorithm \(E\) (here you may assume the compression algorithm takes messages of length up to \(n + 128\) bits as input). Explain why this proposal is of no use for reducing ciphertext size.

Problem 2. The movie industry wants to protect digital content distributed on DVD’s. We study one possible approach. Suppose there are at most a total of \(n\) DVD players in the world (e.g. \(n = 2^{32}\)). We view these \(n\) players as the leaves of a binary tree of height \(\log_2 n\). Every node \(v_j\) in this binary tree contains an AES key \(K_j\). These keys are kept secret from consumers and are fixed for all time. At manufacturing time every DVD player is assigned a serial number \(i \in [0, n - 1]\). Consider the set \(S_i\) of \(1 + \log_2 n\) nodes along the path from the root to leaf number \(i\) in the binary tree. The manufacturer of the DVD player embeds in player number \(i\) the \(1 + \log_2 n\) keys associated with the nodes in \(S_i\). In this way each DVD player ships with \(1 + \log_2 n\) keys embedded in it (these keys are supposedly inaccessible to consumers). A DVD movie \(M\) is encrypted as

\[
DVD = \begin{cases} \text{header} & E_{K_{\text{root}}}(K) \\ \text{body} & E_K(M) \end{cases}
\]

where \(K\) is some random AES key called a content-key. Since all DVD players have the key \(K_{\text{root}}\) all players can decrypt the movie \(M\). We refer to \(E_{K_{\text{root}}}(K)\) as the header and \(E_K(M)\) as the body. In what follows the DVD header may contain multiple ciphertexts where each ciphertext is the encryption of the content-key \(K\) under some key \(K_i\) in the binary tree.

a. Suppose the \(1 + \log_2 n\) keys embedded in DVD player number \(r\) are exposed by hackers and published on the Internet (say in a program like DeCSS). Show that when the movie industry is about to distribute a new DVD movie they can encrypt the contents of the DVD using a
header of size \( \log_2 n \) so that all DVD players can decrypt the movie except for player number \( r \).
In effect, the movie industry disables player number \( r \).
Hint: the header will contain \( \log_2 n \) ciphertexts where each ciphertext is the encryption of the content-key \( K \) under certain \( \log_2 n \) keys from the binary tree.

b. Suppose the keys embedded in \( k \) DVD players \( R = \{r_1, \ldots, r_k\} \) are exposed by hackers.
Show that the movie industry can encrypt the contents of a new DVD using a header of size \( O(k \log n) \) so that all players can decrypt the movie except for the players in \( R \). You have just shown that all hacked players can be disabled without affecting other consumers.

Side note: the AACS system used to encrypt Blu-ray and HD-DVD disks uses a related system. It was quickly discovered that hackers can expose player secret keys faster than the MPAA can revoke them.

Problem 3. The purpose of this problem is to clarify the concept of advantage. Consider the following two experiments EXP(0) and EXP(1):

- In EXP(0) the challenger flips a fair coin (probability 1/2 for HEADS and 1/2 for TAILS) and sends the result to the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \).
- In EXP(1) the challenger always sends TAILS to the adversary.

The adversary’s goal is to distinguish these two experiments: at the end of each experiment the adversary outputs a bit 0 or 1 for its guess for which experiment it is in. For \( b = 0, 1 \) let \( W_b \) be the event that in experiment \( b \) the adversary output 1. The adversary tries to maximize its distinguishing advantage, namely the quantity

\[
\text{Adv} = \left| \Pr[W_0] - \Pr[W_1] \right| \in [0, 1].
\]

The advantage \( \text{Adv} \) captures the adversary’s ability to distinguish the two experiments. If the advantage is 0 then the adversary behaves exactly the same in both experiments and therefore does not distinguish between them. If the advantage is 1 then the adversary can tell perfectly what experiment it is in. If the advantage is negligible for all efficient adversaries (as defined in class) then we say that the two experiments are indistinguishable.

a. Calculate the advantage of each of the following adversaries:
   
   - \( \mathcal{A}_1 \): Always output 1.
   - \( \mathcal{A}_2 \): Ignore the result reported by the challenger, and randomly output 0 or 1 with equal probability.
   - \( \mathcal{A}_3 \): Output 1 if HEADS was received from the challenger, else output 0.
   - \( \mathcal{A}_4 \): Output 0 if HEADS was received from the challenger, else output 1.
   - \( \mathcal{A}_5 \): If HEADS was received, output 1. If TAILS was received, randomly output 0 or 1 with equal probability.

b. What is the maximum advantage possible in distinguishing these two experiments? Explain.

Problem 4. Exercising the definition of semantic security. Let \( (E, D) \) be a semantically secure cipher defined over \( (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}) \), where \( \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^L \). Which of the following encryption algorithms yields a semantically secure scheme? Either give an attack or provide a security proof. To prove security, prove the contrapositive, that is prove that a semantic security attacker \( \mathcal{B} \) on the proposed system gives a semantic security attacker \( \mathcal{A} \) on \( (E, D) \), with the same advantage.
a.  \( E_1(k, m) := 0 \parallel E(k, m) \)

b.  \( E_2(k, m) := E(k, m) \parallel \text{parity}(m) \)

c.  \( E_3(k, m) := \text{reverse}(E(k, m)) \)

d.  \( E_4(k, m) := E(k, \text{reverse}(m)) \)

Here, for a bit string \( s \), \( \text{parity}(s) \) is 1 if the number of 1’s in \( s \) is odd, and 0 otherwise; also, \( \text{reverse}(s) \) is the string obtained by reversing the order of the bits in \( s \), e.g., \( \text{reverse}(1011) = 1101 \).

Problem 5. Let \( F \) be a secure PRF defined over \((\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})\), where \( \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} = \{0,1\}^n \).

a.  Show that \( F_1(k, (x_1, x_2)) := F(k, x_1) \oplus F(k, x_2) \) is insecure. That is show an attacker \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) on \( F_1 \) that has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing \( F_1(k, \cdot) \) from a random function.

b.  Prove that \( F_2(k, x) := F(k, x) \oplus x \) is a secure PRF. Do so using the contrapositive: show that if an adversary \( \mathcal{A}_2 \) can distinguish \( F_2(k, \cdot) \) from a random function then there is adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) (that is a wrapper around \( \mathcal{A}_2 \)) that can distinguish \( F \) from a random function.

The following two exercises rely on the notion of CPA security discussed in the lecture on Jan. 23.

Problem 6. CPA security and ciphertext expansion. Let \( \mathcal{E} = (E, D) \) be an encryption scheme where messages and ciphertexts are bit strings. Suppose that for all keys and all messages \( m \), the encryption of \( m \) is exactly \( \ell \) bits longer than the length of \( m \).

a.  Show an attacker that can win the CPA security game using about \( 2^\ell \) queries and advantage \( \approx 1/2 \). You may assume the message space contains many more than \( 2^\ell \) messages. In fact, there is an attacker that only makes \( 2^\ell/2 \) queries and has the same advantage, but a solution making about \( 2^\ell \) queries is acceptable.

b.  Consider a CBC mode cipher \((E, D)\) that is built from a block cipher that operates on \( \ell \)-bit blocks. Deduce from part (a) that there is a CPA attacker on \((E, D)\) that makes \( 2^\ell/2 \) queries and has advantage \( \approx 1/2 \).

Your answer for part (b) explains why CBC cannot be used with a block cipher that has a small block size (e.g. \( \ell = 64 \) bits). This attack has been used to argue that 3DES-CBC is no longer secure for Internet traffic due to its small 64-bit block size: an attacker who sees \( 2^{32} \) ciphertexts, encrypted using a single key, can learn information about the encrypted plaintexts. This is not the case for AES thanks to its 128-bit block size.

Problem 7. Let \( \mathcal{E} = (E, D) \) be a cipher. Consider the cipher \( \mathcal{E}_2 = (E_2, D_2) \), where \( E_2(k, m) = E(k, E(k, m)) \). One would expect that if encrypting a message once with \( E \) is secure then encrypting it twice as in \( E_2 \) should be no less secure. However, that is not always true.

a.  Show that there is a semantically secure cipher \( \mathcal{E} \) such that \( \mathcal{E}_2 \) is not semantically secure.

b.  Prove that for every CPA secure cipher \( \mathcal{E} \), the cipher \( \mathcal{E}_2 \) is also CPA secure. As usual prove the contrapositive: for every CPA adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) attacking \( \mathcal{E}_2 \) there is a CPA adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) attacking \( \mathcal{E} \) with about the same advantage and running time as \( \mathcal{A} \). Adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) uses \( \mathcal{A} \) as a black box – it plays the role of CPA challenger to \( \mathcal{A} \) with respect to \( \mathcal{E}_2 \). It uses \( \mathcal{A} \) to win the CPA game against its own challenger with respect to \( \mathcal{E} \).