

Assignment #4

Due: Wed., Mar. 12, 2025, by Gradescope (each answer on a separate page).

Problem 1. (*RSA modulus*) Let's explore why in the RSA trapdoor permutation every party has to be assigned a different modulus $n = pq$. Suppose we try to use the same modulus $n = pq$ for everyone. Every party is assigned a public exponent $e_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ and a private exponent $d_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $e_i \cdot d_i = 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$. At first this appears to work fine: to sign a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, Alice would publish the signature $\sigma_a \leftarrow H(m)^{d_a} \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ where $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a hash function. Similarly, Bob would publish the signature $\sigma_b \leftarrow H(m)^{d_b} \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. Since Alice is the only one who knows $d_a \in \mathbb{Z}$ and Bob is the only one who knows $d_b \in \mathbb{Z}$, this seems fine.

Let's show that this is completely insecure: Bob can use his secret key d_b to sign messages on behalf of Alice.

- a. Show that Bob can use his public-private key pair (e_b, d_b) to obtain a multiple of $\varphi(n)$. Let us denote that integer by V .
- b. Now, suppose Bob knows Alice's public key e_a . Show that for any message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, Bob can compute $\sigma \leftarrow H(m)^{1/e_a} \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. In other words, Bob can invert Alice's trapdoor permutation and obtain her signature on m .

Hint: First, suppose e_a is relatively prime to V . Then Bob can find an integer d such that $d \cdot e_a = 1 \pmod{V}$. Show that d can be used to efficiently compute σ . Next, show how to make your algorithm work even if e_a is not relatively prime to V .

Note: In fact, one can show that Bob can completely factor the global modulus n . Then Bob can compute Alice's secret key d_a .

Problem 2. (*RSA signatures*) Consider again the RSA-FDH signature scheme. The public key is a pair (N, e) where N is an RSA modulus, and a signature on a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ is defined as $\sigma := H(m)^{1/e} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, where $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ is a hash function. Suppose the adversary can find three messages $m_1, m_2, m_3 \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $H(m_1) \cdot H(m_2) = H(m_3)$ in \mathbb{Z}_N . Show that the resulting RSA-FDH signature scheme is no longer existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack.

Problem 3. (*Commitment schemes*) A commitment scheme enables Alice to commit a value x to Bob. The scheme is *hiding* if the commitment does not reveal to Bob any information about the committed value x . At a later time Alice may *open* the commitment and convince Bob that the committed value is x . The commitment is *binding* if Alice cannot convince Bob that the committed value is some $x' \neq x$. Here is an example commitment scheme:

Public values: A group \mathbb{G} of prime order q and two generators $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$.

Commitment: To commit to an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ Alice does the following: (1) she chooses a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, (2) she computes $b = g^x \cdot h^r \in \mathbb{G}$, and (3) she sends b to Bob as her commitment to x .

Open: To open the commitment Alice sends (x, r) to Bob. Bob verifies that $b = g^x \cdot h^r$.

Show that this scheme is hiding and binding.

- a. To prove the hiding property show that b reveals no information about x . In other words, show that given b , the committed value can be any element x' in \mathbb{Z}_q .
Hint: show that for any $x' \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ there exists a unique $r' \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ so that $b = g^{x'} h^{r'}$.
- b. To prove the binding property show that if Alice can find a commitment b and two openings (x, r) and (x', r') , where $x \neq x'$, then Alice can compute the discrete log of h base g . Conclude that if the discrete log problem is hard in \mathbb{G} , and h is chosen uniformly in \mathbb{G} , then the commitment scheme must be binding.
Hint: use the fact that $b = g^x h^r = g^{x'} h^{r'}$, where Alice knows x, r, x', r' , to find the discrete log of h base g .
- c. Show that the commitment is *additively homomorphic*: given a commitment to $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and a commitment to $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, Bob can construct a commitment to $z = ax + by$, for any $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ of his choice.

Problem 4. (*Time-space tradeoff*) Let $f : X \rightarrow X$ be a one-way permutation (i.e., a one-to-one function on X). Show that one can build a table T of size $2B$ elements of X ($B \ll |X|$) that enables an attacker to invert f in time $O(|X|/B)$. More precisely, construct an $O(|X|/B)$ -time deterministic algorithm \mathcal{A} that takes as input the table T and a $y \in X$, and outputs an $x \in X$ satisfying $f(x) = y$. This result suggests that the more memory the attacker has, the easier it becomes to invert functions.

Hint: choose a random point $z \in X$ and compute the sequence

$$z_0 := z, \quad z_1 := f(z), \quad z_2 := f(f(z)), \quad z_3 := f(f(f(z))), \quad \dots$$

Since f is a permutation, this sequence must come back to z at some point (i.e. there exists some $j > 0$ such that $z_j = z$). We call the resulting sequence (z_0, z_1, \dots, z_j) an f -cycle. Let $t := \lceil |X|/B \rceil$. Try storing $(z_0, z_t, z_{2t}, z_{3t}, \dots)$ in memory. Use this table (or perhaps, several such tables) to invert an input $y \in X$ in time $O(t)$.

Discussion: Time-space tradeoffs of this nature can be used to attack unsalted hashed passwords, as discussed in class. Time-space tradeoffs also exist for general one-way functions (not just permutations), but their performance is not as good as your time-space tradeoff above. These algorithms are called *Hellman tables* and discussed in Section 18.7 in the book.

Problem 5. (*Identification protocols*) In the lecture on identification protocols we saw a protocol called S/key that uses an iterated one-way function. In this question we explore the security of iterated one-way functions.

- a. Let's show that the iteration of a one-way function need not be one-way. To do so, let $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ be a one-way function, where $0 \in \mathcal{X}$. Let $\hat{f} : \mathcal{X}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^2$ be defined as:

$$\hat{f}(x, y) = \begin{cases} (0, 0) & \text{if } y = 0 \\ (f(x), 0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Show that \hat{f} is one-way, but $\hat{f}^{(2)}(x, y) := \hat{f}(\hat{f}(x, y))$ is not.

- b. Let's show that the iteration of a one-way permutation is also one-way (recall that a permutation is a one-to-one function). Suppose $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ is a one-way permutation. Show that $f^{(2)}(x) := f(f(x))$ is also one-way. As usual, prove the contrapositive.
- c. Explain why your proof from part (b) does not apply to a one-way function. Where does the proof fail?

Problem 6. (*authenticated key exchange*) In class we saw a one-sided AKE (authenticated key exchange protocol) with forward-secrecy and a two-sided AKE without forward-secrecy. Let's try to construct the best of both worlds: a two-sided AKE with forward-secrecy.

Consider the following two-sided AKE with forward-secrecy between Alice and Bank: They each have a certificate for a signing key and we denote by $S_{\text{alice}}(\text{data})$ and $S_{\text{bank}}(\text{data})$ their respective signatures on 'data'. They fix a group \mathbb{G} of order q and generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Alice chooses a random a and Bank chooses a random b , both in \mathbb{Z}_q . They exchange the following messages:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{Alice} & \xrightarrow{g^a, \text{cert}_{\text{alice}}, S_{\text{alice}}(g^a)} & \text{Bank} \\
 & \xleftarrow{g^b, \text{cert}_{\text{bank}}, S_{\text{bank}}(g^a, g^b)} & \\
 k \leftarrow H(g^{ab}, \text{"alice"}) & & k \leftarrow H(g^{ab}, \text{id from cert}_{\text{alice}})
 \end{array}$$

Both sides compute the same key k using a hash function $H : \mathbb{G} \times \mathcal{ID} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$, and each side deletes its secret a or b . If all the certificates and signatures verify correctly then Alice thinks she is speaking with Bank and Bank thinks it is speaking with Alice. The protocol provides forward-secrecy because a compromise of the server or the client does not compromise past sessions.

Since the Diffie-Hellman messages in this protocol are signed by the participants, one might expect that the protocol is secure against a person-in-the-middle attack. Unfortunately that is incorrect: the protocol is vulnerable to an identity misbinding attack. An attacker can cause the protocol to terminate successfully where Bank thinks it is talking to Alice, but Alice thinks she is talking to the attacker.

Describe the attack. What does the attacker do? Recall that the attacker can block messages and replace them with its own messages.