Abstract:
Dining cryptographers networks (or DC-nets) are a privacy-preserving
primitive devised by Chaum for anonymous message publication. A very
attractive feature of the basic DC-net is its non-interactivity.
Subsequent to key establishment, players may publish their messages in a
single broadcast round, with no player-to-player communication. This
feature is not possible in other privacy-preserving tools like mixnets. A
drawback to DC-nets, however, is that malicious players can easily jam
them, i.e., corrupt or block the transmission of messages from honest
parties, and may do so without being traced.
Several researchers have proposed valuable methods of detecting cheating players in DC-nets. This is usually at the cost, however, of multiple broadcast rounds, even in the optimistic case, and often of high computational and/or communications overhead, particularly for fault recovery.
We present new DC-net constructions that simultaneously achieve non-interactivity and high-probability detection and identification of cheating players. Our proposals are quite efficient, imposing a basic cost that is linear in the number of participating players. Moreover, even in the case of cheating in our proposed system, just one additional broadcast round suffices for full fault recovery. Among other tools, our constructions employ bilinear maps, a recently popular cryptographic technique for reducing communication complexity.