AES-GCM for Efficient Authenticated Encryption – Ending the Reign of HMAC-SHA-1?

Shay Gueron

University of Haifa
Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel

Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel

shay@math.haifa.ac.il, shay.gueron@intel.com
Agenda

• Why is the ecosystem using HMAC SHA-1 for authenticated encryption?
  – What can be done to change this?
• AES-GCM dirty secrets... and how to optimize it

(... and save the honor of AES-GCM after Adam’s talk)
Optimizing cryptographic primitives

• Why care? Who cares?
  – The need for end-to-end security in the internet, constantly increases the world-wide number (and percentage) of SSL/TLS connections.
  – Why aren’t all connections https://? Overheads’ costs
    • Cryptographic algorithms for secure communications = computational overhead
    • Mainly on the servers side
  – Any latency client side influences (indirectly) the ecosystem
• Authenticated Encryption: a fundamental cryptographic primitive
• Is the ecosystem using an efficient AE scheme?
  – Apparently no... a better alternative exists
Ciphers in use in SSL/TLS connections

Today’s most frequently used AE in browser/server connections
RC4 + HMAC-MD5 (don’t care)
RC4 + HMAC-SHA-1
AES + HMAC-SHA-1

⇒ authentication: mostly HMAC SHA-1

Is it the best AE (performance wise)?

No – a faster alternative exists

We already know that HMAC is not an efficient MAC scheme, and as an ingredient in AE – it makes an inefficient AE

• Akamai serves service millions of requests per sec. for secure content over HTTPS/SSL
• Observed the client-side SSL ciphers in popular use
• Statistics for SSLv3 and TLSv1
• http://www.akamai.com/stateoftheinternet

AES-GCM is a more efficient Authenticated Encryption scheme
AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption

- AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption (D. McGrew & J. Viega)
  - Designed for high performance (Mainly with a HW viewpoint)
  - A NIST standard FIPS 800-38D (since 2008)
    - Included in the NSA Suite B Cryptography.
- Also in:
  - IPsec (RFC 4106)
  - TLS 1.2
- How it works:
  - Encryption is done with AES in CTR mode
  - Authentication tag computations - “Galois Hash”:
    - A Carter-Wegman-Shoup universal hash construction: polynomial evaluation over a binary field
    - Uses GF(2^{128}) defined by the “lowest” irreducible polynomial
      \[ g = g(x) = x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 \]
  - Computations based on GF(2^{128}) arithmetic

But not really the standard GF(2^{128}) arithmetic
AES-GCM and Intel’s AES-NI / PCLMULQDQ

- Intel introduced a new set of instructions (2010)
- AES-NI:
  - Facilitate high performance AES encryption and decryption
- PCLMULQDQ
  - Binary polynomial multiplication; speeds up computations in binary fields
- Has several usages --- AES-GCM is one
- To use it for the GHASH computations: GF($2^{128}$) multiplication:
  1. Compute $128 \times 128 \rightarrow 256$ via carry-less multiplication (of 64-bit operands)
  2. Reduction: $256 \rightarrow 128$ modulo $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ (done efficiently via software)

It ain’t necessarily so

AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ can be used for speeding up AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption
The performance order is reversed!

AES-NI accelerate the encryption
PCLMULQDQ GF($2^{128}$) stuff (w/o tables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cycles per Byte - lower is better</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRE AES-NI / CLMUL (lookup tables)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC4 + HMAC SHA-1</td>
<td>21.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES + HMAC SHA-1</td>
<td>22.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-GCM</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010 - … POST AES-NI / CLMUL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation; 3rd Generation Core</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core i7-2600K</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core i7-3770</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC4-SHA1</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-SHA1</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-GCM</td>
<td>8.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If AES-GCM is so good, why everyone is still using SHA-1 HMAC?

• **Inertia:** If it works – don’t upgrade it
  – Migration costs and effort
  – Problem is not painful enough / Painful – but to whom?
  – “Legacy”: RC4/AES + HMAC-SHA1 is all over the place

• **Ecosystem awareness:** performance benefit & progression - not fully understood

• **Kickoff latency**
  – AES-GCM is a **relatively new** standard (2008);
    • Part of TLS -- only from TLS 1.2 (which is not proliferated yet)
  – Superior performance: **only** from 2010 (emergence of AES-NI & PCLMULQDQ)

• **The chicken and the egg problem:**
  – Browsers (client) will not upgrade (TLS1.2) and implement (GCM) before “all” servers support TLS 1.2
  – Servers will not upgrade/implement before “all” browsers have TLS1.2 and offer GCM as an option

**In an ideal world:** all servers and clients support TLS 1.2, clients offer AES-GCM at handshake
And the ecosystem would see performance gain
But how can we get there?
What needs to happen?

- **Clients** (browsers): add TLS 1.2, as well as GCM support.
  - The client will then offer that as one of their ciphers
- **Server**: support TLS 1.2 and GCM (today ~9% of the servers)
  - Servers with AES-NI/CLMUL would enjoy the faster cipher

What happens now?

- OpenSSL 1.0.1 already has GCM and TLS 1.2. (and that is slowly deploying)
- Internet Explorer and MSFT server support TLS 1.2
  - AES-GCM (version 8 on Win 7)
- Safari (?) (announced TLS 1.2 and AES-GCM)

The next big move: --- NSS to add support

- (NSS is the stack behind Firefox and Chrome)
- There is ongoing work there on both GCM and TLS 1.2
What did we contribute to this?
The new AES-GCM patches (2012)

- Sept./Oct. 2012: We published two patches for two popular open source distributions: OpenSSL and NSS
  - Authors: S. Gueron and V. Krasnov

- Inherently side channel protected
  - “constant time” in the strict definition

- Fast on the current x86_64 processors (2nd and 3rd Generation Core)
  - Fastest we know of

- And also ready to boost performance on the coming processors generation (4th Generation Core)

- Let’s review how this was done
AES-GCM optimization

1. The encryption
2. The Galois Hash
3. Putting them together
Parallelizable modes (CTR, CBC decryption, XTS) can interleave processing of multiple messages. They become much faster with AES-NI.
How much to parallelize?
The effect of the parallelization parameter

Encryption of 8 blocks in parallel vs. encryption of 4 blocks in parallel

We found the 8 blocks in parallel is a sweat point
AES-CTR performance

Previous Generation Core, Second Generation Core, Thirds Generation Core
Intel® Core™ i7-2600K vs. Intel® Core™ i7-880 Processor
(1KB buffer; performance in CPU cycles per Byte)

S. Gueron. RWC 2013
128-bit Carry-less Multiplication using PCLMULQDQ

(Gueron Kounavis, 2009) Multiply $128 \times 128 \rightarrow 256$ \([A_1: A_0] \cdot [B_1: B_0]\)

- **Schoolbook** (4 PCLMULQDQ invocations)
  \[
  A_0 \cdot B_0 = [C_1: C_0], \quad A_1 \cdot B_1 = [D_1: D_0] \\
  A_0 \cdot B_1 = [E_1: E_0], \quad A_1 \cdot B_0 = [F_1: F_0] \\
  \]
  \[
  [A_1: A_0] \cdot [B_1: B_0] = [D_1: D_0 \oplus E_1 \oplus F_1: C_1 \oplus E_0 \oplus F_0: C_0] \\
  \]

- **Carry-less Karatsuba** (3 PCLMULQDQ invocations)
  \[
  A_1 \cdot B_1 = [C_1: C_0], \quad A_0 \cdot B_0 = [D_1: D_0] \\
  (A_1 \oplus A_0) \cdot (B_1 \oplus B_0) = [E_0: E_1] \\
  \]
  \[
  [A_1: A_0] \cdot [B_1: B_0] = [C_1: C_0 \oplus C_1 \oplus D_1 \oplus E_1: D_1 \oplus C_0 \oplus D_0 \oplus E_0: D_0] \\
  \]
AES-GCM dirty secrets revealed
A new interpretation to GHASH operations

- Not what you expected: GHASH *does not* use GF(2^{128}) computations
  - At least not in the usual polynomial representation convention
  - The bits inside the 128-bit operands are reflected
  - Actually - it is an operation on a permutation of the elements of GF(2^{128})
    - T1 = reflect (A)
    - T2 = reflect (B)
    - T3 = T1 × T2 modulo x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 (a GF(2^{128}) multiplication)
    - Reflect (T3)
- We can prove (a new interpretation) that this operation is:
  - A × B × x^{-127} mod x^{128} + x^{127}+x^{126}+x^{121} + 1
  - i.e., a weird Montgomery Multiplication in GF(2^{128}) modulo a reversed poly
  - Better written as
    - A × B × x × x^{-128} mod x^{128} + x^{127}+x^{126}+x^{121} + 1
The Shift-XOR reflected reduction
(Gueron Kounavis 2009)
Voila
Fast reduction modulo $x^{128}+x^{127}+x^{126}+x^{121}+1$
(Gueron 2012)

Algorithm 4: “Montgomery reduction”
Input 256-bit operand $[X_X: X_2: X_1: X_0]$

$[A_1: A_0] = X_0 \cdot 0xc200000000000000$
$[B_1: B_0] = [X_0 \oplus A_1: X_1 \oplus A_0]$
$[C_1: C_0] = B_0 \cdot 0xc200000000000000$
$[D_1: D_0] = [B_0 \oplus C_1: B_1 \oplus C_0]$
Output: $[D_1 \oplus X_3: D_0 \oplus X_2]$

The cost:
- 2 x PCLMULQDQ
- 3 x shift/xor
- Ideal with fast PCLMULQDQ

; Input is in T1:T7
vmovdqa T3, [W]
vpclmulqdq T2, T3, T7, 0x01
vpshufd T4, T7, 78
vpxor T4, T4, T2
vpclmulqdq T2, T3, T4, 0x01
vpshufd T4, T4, 78
vpxor T4, T4, T2
vpxor T1, T4 ; result in T1
The optimized reflected reduction

Voila
Aggregated Reduction

The Ghash operation is:

$$\text{MM} (\text{CT}_1, Hx^{m''}) + \text{MM} (\text{CT}_2, Hx^{m''-1''}) + \ldots + \text{MM} (\text{CT}_m, Hx)$$

$$\mod x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$$

- In a Horner form (facilitating iterative computation)
  - $$Y_i = \text{MM} [(X_i + Y_{i-1}), Hx]$$ … everything mod Q = $$x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$$

- 4-way expanded Horner form (aggregate results & defer the reduction step)
  - $$Y_i = \text{MM} [(X_i + Y_{i-1}), Hx] = \text{MM} [(X_i, Hx)] + \text{MM} [(Y_{i-1}, Hx)]$$
    $$= \text{MM} [(X_i, Hx)] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-1} + Y_{i-2}), Hx^{2''}]$$
    $$= \text{MM} [(X_i, Hx)] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-1}, Hx^{2''})] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-2} + Y_{i-3}), Hx^{3''}]$$
    $$= \text{MM} [(X_i, Hx)] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-1}, Hx^{2''})] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-2}, Hx^{3''})] + \text{MM} [(X_{i-3} + Y_{i-4}), Hx^{4''}]$$
  - Can be expanded further
  - The gain: reduction deferred to once per “N” blocks
  - Overhead: pre-calculate the powers of H (amortized for reasonably long buffer)
Interleaving CTR and GHASH

- There are two approaches to GCM
  - Use dedicated AES-CTR function for the encryption and another GHASH function to generate the MAC
  - Gain additional performance by interleaving the calculation of CTR and GHASH in a single function
- The first approach can only achieve the performance of “CTR+GHASH”
- The second approach achieves a better performance
  - Filling the execution pipe more efficiently.
The new AES-GCM patches (2012) putting it (and more...) all together

- Sept./Oct. 2012: We published two patches for two popular open source distributions: OpenSSL and NSS
  - NSS patch to be committed into version 3.14.2

- Both patches share similar code and use:
  - Carry-less Karatsuba multiplication
  - Reduce using “Montgomery”
  - Encrypt 8 counter blocks
  - Deferred reduction (using 8 block aggregation)
  - Fixed elements outside the brackets
  - Interleave CTR and GHASH

- Inherently side channel protected
  - “constant time” in the strict definition

- Fast on current processors (2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Generation Core)

- And also ready to boost on the coming processors (4\textsuperscript{th} Generation Core)
Results

The performance of AES-128 GCM Encryption on 4KB buffer in CPU cycles per Byte, Intel® Core™ i7-2600K vs. Intel® Core™ i7-880 Processor, Lower is better

![Bar chart showing performance comparisons between two processors and the best known AES-GCM without AES-NI on Intel® Core™ i7-2600K Processor.]

Some breakdown

- AES-GCM:
  - 4KB message: 2.53 C/B
  - 16KB message: 2.47 C/B

- Breakdown
  - CTR performance for 16KB: 0.79 C/B
  - The cost of the GHASH is ~1.68 C/B
    - ~68% of the computations
  - The performance of standalone GHASH is 1.75 C/B
    - The delta is the gain from interleaving GHASH with CTR.

- Notes: the MAC computations are still significant
  - Limited by the current performance of PCLMULQDQ
  - Ultimate goal: achieve AES-GCM at the performance of CTR+ \( \varepsilon \)
The NSS patch (2012)

The performance of NSS AES GCM Encryption on 8KB buffer in CPU cycles per Byte, Intel® Core™ i7-2600K and Intel® Core™ i7-3770 Processors, Lower is better

55.42
53.67
2.70
2.66

Ready to boost performance on the coming processors generation (4th Generation Core)
The performance of OpenSSL AES GCM Encryption on 8KB buffer in CPU cycles per Byte, Intel® Core™ i7-2600K and Intel® Core™ i7-3770 Processors, Lower is better

Ready to boost performance on the coming processors generation (4th Generation Core)
What does it give?

AES-GCM vs. other (NIST standard) Authenticated Encryption

The performance of NSS AES GCM Encryption on 32KB buffer in CPU cycles per Byte, Intel® Core™ i7-2600K and Intel® Core™ i7-3770 Processors, Lower is better

S. Gueron. RWC 2013
Summary

- AES-GCM is the best performing Authenticated Encryption combination among the NIST standard options (esp. compared to using HMAC SHA-1)
  - SE on x86-64
  - + Performance keeps improving across CPU generations
  - Just wait for the coming “4th Generation Core” (2013)
- We try to actively help the eco-system move to the more efficient AE
- With some luck, we might see significant deployment already in 2013
  - Optimized algorithms & implementations released as patches for Open Source
  - Thanks to Google/Mozilla/RedHat colleagues
    - Review and commit to NSS; add TLS1.2; enable Firefox / Chrome support
- The ultimate goal: achieve AES-GCM at the performance of CTR+ $\varepsilon$
- All the codes and papers are publicly available (see reference)
References
References

AES-GCM (The algorithms and methods that underlie the AES-GCM patches codes are detailed in references [1-4])


AES-NI


OpenSSL patch:

NSS patch:
• S. Gueron, V. Krasnov, “Efficient AES-GCM implementation that uses Intel's AES and PCLMULQDQ instructions (AES-NI), and the Advanced Vector Extension (AVX) architecture. For the NSS library”, Attachment 673021 Details for Bug 373108, [PATCH] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=805604#c0 (2012)