

TCG: Trusted Computing Group

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Background

- ◆ TCG consortium. Founded in 1999 as TCPA.
 - Main players (promoters): (>200 members)
AMD, HP, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Sun
- ◆ Goals:
 - **Hardware protected (encrypted) storage:**
 - Only "authorized" software can decrypt data
 - e.g.: protecting key for decrypting file system
 - **Secure boot:** method to "authorize" software
 - **Attestation:** Prove to remote server what software is running on my machine.

TCG: changes to PC or cell phone

- ◆ Extra hardware: **TPM**
 - **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)** chip
 - Single 33Mhz clock.
 - TPM Chip vendors: (~7\$)
 - Atmel, Infineon, National, STMicro
 - Intel D875GRH motherboard
- ◆ Software changes:
 - BIOS
 - OS and Apps


TPMs in the real world

- ◆ Systems containing TPM chips:
 - Lenovo (IBM) Thinkpads and desktops
 - Fujitsu lifebook
 - HP desktop and notebooks
- ◆ Software using TPMs:
 - File/disk encryption: Vista, IBM, HP, Softex
 - Attestation for enterprise login: Cognizance, Wave
 - Client-side single sign on: IBM, Utimaco, Wave

TPM 101

- What the TPM does
- How to use it

Components on TPM chip



RSA: 1024, 2048 bit modulus
 SHA-1: Outputs 20 byte digest


PCR: the heart of the matter

- ◆ *PCR: Platform Configuration Registers*
 - Lots of PCR registers on chip (at least 16)
 - Register contents: 20-byte SHA-1 digest (+junk)
- ◆ Updating PCR #n :
 - TPM_Extend(n,D): $PCR[n] \leftarrow SHA-1(PCR[n] || D)$
 - TPM_PcrRead(n): returns value(PCR(n))
- ◆ PCRs initialized to default value (e.g. 0) at boot time
 - TPM can be told to restore PCR values via TPM_SaveState and TPM_Startup(ST_STATE)

Using PCRs: the TCG boot process


- ◆ At power-up PCR[n] initialized to 0
- ◆ BIOS boot block executes
 - Calls $PCR_Extend(n, <BIOS\ code>)$
 - Then loads and runs BIOS post boot code
- ◆ BIOS executes:
 - Calls $PCR_Extend(n, <MBR\ code>)$
 - Then runs MBR (master boot record), e.g. GRUB.
- ◆ MBR executes:
 - Calls $PCR_Extend(n, <OS\ loader\ code, config>)$
 - Then runs OS loader ... and so on

In a diagram



- After boot, PCRs contain hash chain of booted software
- Collision resistance of SHA1 (?) ensures commitment

Example: Trusted GRUB (IBM/05)



What PCR # to use and what to measure specified in GRUB config file

Using PCR values after boot

- ◆ Application 1: encrypted (a.k.a sealed) storage.
- ◆ Step 1: $TPM_TakeOwnership(OwnerPassword, \dots)$
 - Creates 2048-bit RSA Storage Root Key (SRK) on TPM
 - Cannot run TPM_TakeOwnership again:
 - ◆ Ownership Enabled flag \leftarrow False
 - Done once by IT department or laptop owner.
- ◆ (optional) Step 2: $TPM_CreateWrapKey$
 - Create more RSA keys on TPM certified by SRK
 - Each key identified by 32-bit keyhandle

Protected Storage

- ◆ Main Step: Encrypt data using RSA key on TPM
 - TPM_Seal (some) Arguments:
 - ◆ keyhandle: which TPM key to encrypt with
 - ◆ KeyAuth: Password for using key `keyhandle`
 - ◆ PcrValues: PCRs to embed in encrypted blob
 - ◆ data block: at most 256 bytes (2048 bits)
 - Used to encrypt symmetric key (e.g. AES)
 - Returns encrypted blob.
- ◆ Main point: blob can only be decrypted with TPM_Unseal when $PCR-reg-vals = PCR-vals$ in blob.
 - TPM_Unseal will fail otherwise

Protected Storage

- ◆ Embedding PCR values in blob ensures that only certain apps can decrypt data.
 - e.g.: Messing with MBR or OS kernel will change PCR values.
- ◆ Why can't attacker disable TPM until after boot, then extend PCRs with whatever he wants?
 - Root of trust: BIOS boot block.
- ◆ Gaping hole: role-back attack on encrypted blobs
 - e.g. undo security patches without being noticed.
 - Can be mitigated using Data Integrity Regs (DIR)

Sealed storage: applications

- ◆ Lock software on machine:
 - OS and apps sealed with MBR's PCR.
 - Any changes to MBR (to load other OS) will prevent locked software from loading.
 - Prevents reverse-engineering
- ◆ Web server: seal server's SSL private key
 - Goal: only unmodified Apache can access SSL key
 - Problem: updates to Apache, config, or content
- ◆ General problem with software patches:
 - When updating MBR, must re-seal blobs
 - Not a simple process ...

TPM Counters

- ◆ TPM must support at least four hardware counters
 - Increment rate: every 5 seconds for 7 years.
- ◆ Applications:
 - Provides time stamps on blobs.
 - Supports "music will pay for 30 days" policy.

Non-volatile TPM memory

- ◆ Stores:
 - Storage Root Key (SRK)
 - Owner Password

} Generated when user takes ownership

 - Endorsement Key (EK)
 - ◆ Created once for the life of the TPM
 - ◆ Certificate for EK issued by TPM vendor
 - ◆ Basis of attestation
 - Persistent flags (e.g. ownership flag)

Attestation

Attestation: what it does

- ◆ **Goal:** prove to remote party what software is running on my machine.
- ◆ Good applications:
 - Bank allows money transfer only if customer's machine runs "up-to-date" OS patches.
 - Enterprise allows laptop to connect to its network only if laptop runs "authorized" software
 - Quake players can join a Quake network only if their Quake client is unmodified.
- ◆ DRM:
 - MusicStore sells content for authorized players only.


Attestation: how it works

- ◆ Recall: EK private key on TPM.
 - Cert for EK public-key issued by TPM vendor.
- ◆ Step 1: Create Attestation Identity Key (AIK)
 - Details not important.
 - AIK Private key known only to TPM
 - AIK public cert issued only if EK cert is valid

Attestation: how it works


- ◆ Step 2: sign PCR values (after boot)
 - Call `TPM_Quote` (some) Arguments:
 - ◆ `keyhandle`: which AIK key to sign with
 - ◆ `KeyAuth`: Password for using key `keyhandle`
 - ◆ `PCR List`: Which PCRs to sign.
 - ◆ `Challenge`: 20-byte challenge from remote server
 - Prevents replay of old signatures.
 - ◆ `Userdata`: additional data to include in sig.
 - Returns signed data and signature.

Attestation: how it (should) work



Using Attestation

Attesting to VMs: Terra [SOSP'03]



TVMM Provides isolation between attested applications

Nexus OS (Sierer et al. '06)

- ◆ Problem: attesting to hashed application/kernel code
 - Too many possible software configurations
- ◆ Better approach: attesting to properties
 - Example: "application never writes to disk"
- ◆ Supported in Nexus OS (Sierer et al. '06)
 - General attestation statements:
 - ◆ "TPM says that it booted Nexus, Nexus says that it ran checker with hash X, checker says that IPD A has property P"

EFF: Owner Override

- ◆ TCG attestation:
 - **The good:** enables user to prove to remote bank that machine is up-to-date
 - **The bad:** content owners can release decryption key only to machines running "authorized" software.
 - ◆ Stifles innovation in player design
- ◆ EFF: allow users to inject chosen values into PCRs.
 - Enables users to conceal changes to their computing environment.
 - Still defeats malicious changes to computing platform

TCG Alternatives

- ◆ IBM 4758: Supports all TCG functionality and more.
 - Tamper resistant 486 100MHz PCI co-processor.
 - Programmable.
 - ... but expensive ~ \$2000. TPM ~ \$7.
- ◆ AEGIS System: Arbaugh, Farber, Smith '97:
 - Secure boot with BIOS changes only.
 - Cannot support sealed storage.
 - **Phoenix TrustConnector 2**
- ◆ SWATT: Seshadri et al., 2004
 - Attestation w/o extra hardware
 - Server must know precise HW configuration

Attestation: challenges

1. Attesting to Current State

- ◆ Attestation only attests to what code was loaded.
- ◆ Does not say whether running code has been compromised.
 - Problem: what if Quake vulnerability exploited after attestation took place?
- ◆ Can we attest to the current state of a running system?
 - ... or is there a better way?

2. Encrypted viruses

- ◆ Suppose malicious music file exploits bug in Windows Media Player.
 - Music file is encrypted.
 - TCG prevents anyone from getting music file in the clear.
- Can anti-virus companies block virus without ever seeing its code in the clear?

3. TPM Compromise

- ◆ Suppose one TPM Endorsement Private Key is exposed
 - Destroys all attestation infrastructure:
 - ◆ Embed private EK in TPM emulator.
 - ◆ Now, can attest to anything without running it.
- ⇒ Certificate Revocation is critical for TCG Attestation.

4. Private attestation

- ◆ Attestation should not reveal platform ID.
 - Recall Intel CPU-ID fiasco.
- ◆ Private attestation:
 - Remote server can validate trustworthiness of attestation
 - ... but cannot tell what machine it came from.
- ◆ TCG Solutions:
 - Privacy CA: online trusted party
 - Group sigs: privacy without trusted infrastructure

THE END