Network Protocols and Vulnerabilities

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Outline

- Basic Networking
- Network attacks
  - Attack host networking protocols
    - SYN flooding, TCP Spoofing, …
  - Attack network infrastructure
    - Routing
    - Domain Name System

This lecture is about the way things work now and how they are not perfect. Next lecture – some security improvements (still not perfect).

Internet Infrastructure



- Local and interdomain routing
  - TCP/IP for routing, connections
  - BGP for routing announcements
- Domain Name System
  - Find IP address

TCP Protocol Stack



Data Formats



IP

Internet Protocol

- Connectionless
  - Unreliable
  - Best effort
- Transfer datagram
  - Header
  - Data



IP Routing



- Internet routing uses numeric IP address
- Typical route uses several hops

IP Protocol Functions (Summary)

- Routing
  - IP host knows location of router (gateway)
  - IP gateway must know route to other networks
- Fragmentation and reassembly
  - If max-packet-size less than the user-data-size
- Error reporting
  - ICMP packet to source if packet is dropped

UDP

User Datagram Protocol

- IP provides routing
  - IP address gets datagram to a specific machine
- UDP separates traffic by port
  - Destination port number gets UDP datagram to particular application process, e.g., 128.3.23.3, 53
  - Source port number provides return address
- Minimal guarantees
  - No acknowledgment
  - No flow control
  - No message continuation

TCP

Transmission Control Protocol

- Connection-oriented, preserves order
  - Sender
    - Break data into packets
    - Attach packet numbers
  - Receiver
    - Acknowledge receipt; lost packets are resent
    - Reassemble packets in correct order

ICMP

Internet Control Message Protocol

- Provides feedback about network operation
  - Error reporting
  - Reachability testing
  - Congestion Control
- Example message types
  - Destination unreachable
  - Time-to-live exceeded
  - Parameter problem
  - Redirect to better gateway
  - Echo/echo reply - reachability test
  - Timestamp request/reply - measure transit delay

Basic Security Problems

- Network packets pass by untrusted hosts
  - Eavesdropping, packet sniffing
- IP addresses are public
  - Smurf
- TCP connection requires state
  - SYN flooding attack
- TCP state easy to guess
  - TCP spoofing attack

Packet Sniffing

- Promiscuous NIC reads all packets
  - Read all unencrypted data
  - ftp, telnet send passwords in clear!



Sweet Hall attack installed sniffer on local machine

Prevention: Encryption, improved routing (Next lecture: IPSEC)

Smurf DoS Attack



- Send ping request to brdcst addr (ICMP Echo Req)
- Lots of responses:
  - Every host on target network generates a ping reply (ICMP Echo Reply) to victim
  - Ping reply stream can overload victim

Prevention: reject external packets to brdcst address.

TCP Handshake



SYN Flooding



SYN Flooding

- Attacker sends many connection requests
  - Spoofed source addresses
- Victim allocates resources for each request
  - Connection requests exist until timeout
  - Fixed bound on half-open connections
- Resources exhausted ⇒ requests rejected

Protection against SYN Attacks

[Bernstein, Schenk]

- Client sends SYN
- Server responds to Client with SYN-ACK cookie
  - sqn = f(src addr, src port, dest addr, dest port, rand)
  - Server does not save state
- Honest client responds with ACK(sqn)
- Server checks response
  - If matches SYN-ACK, establishes connection

See http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html

TCP Connection Spoofing

- Each TCP connection has an associated state
  - Client IP and port number; same for server
  - Sequence numbers for client, server flows
- Problem
  - Easy to guess state
    - Port numbers are standard
    - Sequence numbers often chosen in predictable way

IP Spoofing Attack



- A, B trusted connection
  - Send packets with predictable seq numbers
- E impersonates B to A
  - Opens connection to A to get initial seq number
  - SYN-floods B's queue
  - Sends packets to A that resemble B's transmission
  - E cannot receive, but may execute commands on A

Attack can be blocked if E is outside firewall.

TCP Sequence Numbers

- Need high degree of unpredictability
  - If attacker knows initial seq # and amount of traffic sent, can estimate likely current values
  - Send a flood of packets with likely seq numbers
  - Attacker can inject packets into existing connection

Recent DoS vulnerability [Watson'04]

- Suppose attacker can guess seq. number for an existing connection:
  - Attacker can send Reset packet to close connection. Results in DoS.
  - Naively, success prob. is $1/2^{32}$ (32-bit seq. #'s).
  - Most systems allow for a large window of acceptable seq. #'s
    - Much higher success probability.
- Attack is most effective against long lived connections, e.g. BGP.

Cryptographic protection

- Solutions above the transport layer
  - Examples: SSL and SSH
  - Protect against session hijacking and injected data
  - Do not protect against denial-of-service attacks caused by spoofed packets
- Solutions at network layer
  - Use cryptographically random ISNs [RFC 1948]
  - More generally: IPsec
  - Can protect against
    - session hijacking and injection of data
    - denial-of-service attacks using session resets

TCP Congestion Control



- If packets are lost, assume congestion
  - Reduce transmission rate by half, repeat
  - If loss stops, increase rate very slowly

Design assumes routers blindly obey this policy

Competition



- Amiable Alice yields to boisterous Bob
  - Alice and Bob both experience packet loss
  - Alice backs off
  - Bob disobeys protocol, gets better results

Routing Vulnerabilities

- Source routing attack
  - Can direct response through compromised host
- Routing Information Protocol (RIP)
  - Direct client traffic through compromised host
- Exterior gateway protocols
  - Advertise false routes
  - Send traffic through compromised hosts

Source Routing Attacks

- Attack
  - Destination host may use reverse of source route provided in TCP open request to return traffic
    - Modify the source address of a packet
    - Route traffic through machine controlled by attacker
- Defenses
  - Only accept source route if trusted gateways listed in source routing info
  - Gateway rejects external packets claiming to be local
  - Reject pre-authorized connections if source routing info present

Routing Table Update Protocols

- Interior Gateway Protocols: IGPs
  - distance vector type - each gateway keeps track of its distance to all destinations
    - Gateway-to-Gateway: GGP
    - Routing Information Protocol: RIP
- Exterior Gateway Protocol: EGP
  - used for communication between different autonomous systems

Routing Information Protocol (RIP)

- Attack
  - Intruder sends bogus routing information to a target and each of the gateways along the route
    - Impersonates an unused host
      - Diverts traffic for that host to the intruder's machine
    - Impersonates a used host
      - All traffic to that host routed to the intruder's machine
      - Intruder inspects packets & resends to host w/ source routing
      - Allows capturing of unencrypted passwords, data, etc

Routing Information Protocol (RIP)

- Defense
  - Firewall at the gateway
    - Filters packets based on source and/or destination addresses
  - Don't accept new routes to local networks
    - Interferes with fault-tolerance but detects intrusion attempts
  - Authenticate RIP packets
    - Difficult in a broadcast protocol
    - Only allows for authentication of prior sender

Interdomain Routing





BGP overview

- Iterative path announcement
  - Path announcements grow from destination to source
  - Packets flow in reverse direction
- Protocol specification
  - Announcements *can* be shortest path
  - Nodes allowed to use other policies
    - E.g., "cold-potato routing" by smaller peer
  - Not obligated to use path you announce

BGP example [D. Wetherall]



- Transit: 2 provides transit for 7
  - 7 reaches and is reached via 2

Issues

- Security problems
  - Potential for disruptive attacks
  - BGP packets are un-authenticated
- Incentive for dishonesty
  - ISP pays for some routes, others free

DNS

Domain Name System

- Hierarchical Name Space



DNS Root Name Servers

- Root name servers for top-level domains
- Authoritative name servers for subdomains
- Local name resolvers contact authoritative servers when they do not know a name



DNS Lookup Example



Caching

- DNS responses are cached
  - Quick response for repeated translations
  - Other queries may reuse some parts of lookup
    - NS records for domains
- DNS negative queries are cached
  - Don't have to repeat past mistakes
  - E.g. misspellings
- Cached data periodically times out
  - Lifetime (TTL) of data controlled by owner of data
  - TTL passed with every record

Subsequent Lookup Example



DNS Implementation Vulnerabilities

- Reverse query buffer overrun in BIND Releases 4.9 (4.9.7 prior) and Releases 8 (8.1.2 prior)
  - gain root access
  - abort DNS service
- MS DNS for NT 4.0 (service pack 3 and prior)
  - crashes on chargen stream
  - telnet ntbox 19 | telnet ntbox 53

Inherent DNS Vulnerabilities

- Users/hosts typically trust the host-address mapping provided by DNS
- Problems
  - Interception of requests or compromise of DNS servers can result in bogus responses
  - Zone transfers can provide useful list of target hosts
  - Solution – authenticated requests/responses

Bellovin/Mockapetris Attack

- Trust relationships use symbolic addresses
  - /etc/hosts.equiv contains friend.stanford.edu
- Requests come with numeric source address
  - Use reverse DNS to find symbolic name
  - Decide access based on /etc/hosts.equiv, …
- Attack
  - Spoof reverse DNS to make host trust attacker

Reverse DNS

- Given numeric IP address, find symbolic addr
- To find 222.33.44.3,
  - Query 44.33.222.in-addr.arpa
  - Get list of symbolic addresses, e.g.,

```
1   IN   PTR   server.small.com
2   IN   PTR   boss.small.com
3   IN   PTR   ws1.small.com
4   IN   PTR   ws2.small.com
```

Attack

- Gain control of DNS service for evil.org
- Select target machine in good.net
- Find trust relationships
  - SNMP, finger can help find active sessions, etc.
  - Example: target trusts host1.good.net
- Connect
  - Attempt rlogin from coyote.evil.org
  - Target contacts reverse DNS server with IP addr
  - Use modified reverse DNS to say "addr belongs to host1.good.net"
  - Target allows rlogin

Defense against this attack

- Double-check reverse DNS
  - Modify rlogind, rshd to query DNS server
  - See if symbolic addr maps to numeric addr
  - But then must deal with cache poisoning …
- Authenticate entries in DNS tables
  - Relies on some form of PKI?
  - Next lecture …

See http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/notes.html

JavaScript/DNS intranet attack (I)

- Consider a Web server intra.good.net
  - IP: 10.0.0.7, inaccessible outside good.net network
  - Hosts sensitive CGI applications
- Attacker at evil.org wishes to subvert
- Gets good.net user to browse www.evil.org
- Places JS that has accesses web app on intra.good.net
- This doesn't work: JS enforces "same-origin" policy
- But note attacker controls evil.org DNS …

JavaScript/DNS intranet attack (II)



Summary (I)

- Eavesdropping
  - Encryption, improved routing (Next lecture: IPsec)
- Smurf
  - Drop external packets to brdcst address
- SYN Flooding
  - SYN Cookies
- IP spoofing
  - Use less predictable sequence numbers

Summary (II)

- Source routing attacks
  - Additional info in packets, tighter control over routing
- Interdomain routing
  - Authenticate routing announcements
  - Many other issues
- DNS attacks
  - Double-check reverse DNS
  - Authenticate entries in DNS tables