

Control Hijacking


Basic Control Hijacking Attacks

Control hijacking attacks

- <u>Attacker's goal</u>:
 - Take over target machine (e.g. web server)
 - Execute arbitrary code on target by hijacking application control flow
- Examples.
 - Buffer overflow attacks
 - Integer overflow attacks
 - Format string vulnerabilities

Example 1: buffer overflows

- Extremely common bug in C/C++ programs.
 - First major exploit: 1988 Internet Worm. fingerd.




Source: web.nvd.nist.gov


What is needed

- Understanding C functions, the stack, and the heap.
- Know how system calls are made
- The exec() system call

- Attacker needs to know which CPU and OS used on the target machine:
 - Our examples are for x86 running Linux or Windows
 - Details vary slightly between CPUs and OSs:
 - Little endian vs. big endian (x86 vs. Motorola)
 - Stack Frame structure (Unix vs. Windows)



Stack Frame



What are buffer overflows?

Suppose a web server contains a function:


When func() is called stack looks like:

SP

argument: str return address stack frame pointer char buf[128] void func(char *str) {
 char buf[128];
 strcpy(buf, str);

do-something(buf);

What are buffer overflows?




Basic stack exploit

Suppose *str is such that after strcpy stack looks like:

Program P: exec("/bin/sh")

(exact shell code by Aleph One)

When func() exits, the user gets shell ! Note: attack code P runs *in stack*.




The NOP slide

Problem: how does attacker determine ret-address?

Solution: NOP slide

- Guess approximate stack state when func() is called
- Insert many NOPs before program P: nop , xor eax,eax , inc ax



Details and examples

- Some complications:
 - Program P should not contain the '\0' character.
 - Overflow should not crash program before func() exists.
- (in)Famous <u>remote</u> stack smashing overflows:
 - Overflow in Windows animated cursors (ANI). LoadAnilcon()
 - Past overflow in Symantec virus detection

test.GetPrivateProfileString "file", [long string]

Many unsafe libc functions

```
strcpy (char *dest, const char *src)
strcat (char *dest, const char *src)
gets (char *s)
scanf ( const char *format, ... ) and many more.
```

- "Safe" libc versions strncpy(), strncat() are misleading
 e.g. strncpy() may leave string unterminated.
- Windows C run time (CRT):
 - strcpy_s (*dest, DestSize, *src): ensures proper termination

Buffer overflow opportunities

- Exception handlers: (Windows SEH attacks)
 - Overwrite the address of an exception handler in stack frame.


• Function pointers: (e.g. PHP 4.0.2, MS MediaPlayer Bitmaps)



- Overflowing buf will override function pointer.
- Longjmp buffers: longjmp(pos) (e.g. Perl 5.003)
 - Overflowing buf next to pos overrides value of pos.

Corrupting method pointers

• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)



Finding buffer overflows

- To find overflow:
 - Run web server on local machine
 - Issue malformed requests (ending with "\$\$\$\$")
 - Many automated tools exist (called fuzzers next week)
 - If web server crashes,

search core dump for "\$\$\$\$" to find overflow location

• Construct exploit (not easy given latest defenses)



Control Hijacking

More Control Hijacking Attacks

More Hijacking Opportunities

- Integer overflows: (e.g. MS DirectX MIDI Lib)
- **Double free**: double free space on heap
 - Can cause memory mgr to write data to specific location
 - Examples: CVS server
- Use after free: using memory after it is freed
- Format string vulnerabilities

Integer Overflows (see Phrack 60)

Problem: what happens when int exceeds max value?

int m; (32 bits) short s; (16 bits) char c; (8 bits)

$$c = 0x80 + 0x80 = 128 + 128 \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad c = 0$$

$$s = 0xff80 + 0x80 \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad s = 0$$


$$m = 0xfffff80 + 0x80 \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad m = 0$$

Can this be exploited?

An example

```
void func( char *buf1, *buf2, unsigned int len1, len2) {
    char temp[256];
    if (len1 + len2 > 256) {return -1} // length check
    memcpy(temp, buf1, len1); // cat buffers
    memcpy(temp+len1, buf2, len2);
    do-something(temp); // do stuff
}
```

Integer overflow exploit stats





Format string bugs

Format string problem int func(char *user) { fprintf(stderr, user); }

<u>Problem</u>: what if *user = "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s" ??

- Most likely program will crash: DoS.
- If not, program will print memory contents. Privacy?
- Full exploit using user = "%n"

<u>Correct form</u>: **fprintf(stdout**, "%s", **user**);

Vulnerable functions

Any function using a format string.

Printing: printf, fprintf, sprintf, ... vprintf, vfprintf, vsprintf, ...

Logging:

syslog, err, warn

Exploit

- Dumping arbitrary memory:
 - Walk up stack until desired pointer is found.
 - printf("%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x|%s|")

- Writing to arbitrary memory:
 - printf("hello %n", &temp) -- writes '6' into temp.
 - printf("%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%n")



Control Hijacking

Platform Defenses

Preventing hijacking attacks

- 1. <u>Fix bugs</u>:
 - Audit software
 - Automated tools: Coverity, Prefast/Prefix.
 - Rewrite software in a type safe languange (Java, ML)
 - Difficult for existing (legacy) code ...
- 2. Concede overflow, but prevent code execution
- 3. Add <u>runtime code</u> to detect overflows exploits
 - Halt process when overflow exploit detected
 - StackGuard, LibSafe, ...

Marking memory as non-execute (DEP)

Prevent attack code execution by marking stack and heap as **non-executable**

- NX-bit on AMD Athlon 64, XD-bit on Intel P4 Prescott
 - NX bit in every Page Table Entry (PTE)
- <u>Deployment</u>:
 - Linux (via PaX project); OpenBSD
 - Windows: since XP SP2 (DEP)
 - Visual Studio: /NXCompat[:NO]
- <u>Limitations</u>:
 - Some apps need executable heap (e.g. JITs).
 - Does not defend against `Return Oriented Programming' exploits

Examples: DEP controls in Windows


Performance Options	
Visual Effects Advanced Data Execution Prevention	
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) helps protect against damage from viruses and other security threats. <u>How does it work?</u>	
Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only	
Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select:	Data Executio
	To help prot
	Name: Publish
Add Remove	Data Execution security threat
Your computer's processor supports hardware-based DEP.	DEP
OK Cancel Apply	



DEP terminating a program

Attack: Return Oriented Programming (ROP)

• Control hijacking without executing code



Response: randomization

- **ASLR**: (Address Space Layout Randomization)
 - Map shared libraries to rand location in process memory
 - \Rightarrow Attacker cannot jump directly to exec function
 - Deployment: (/DynamicBase)
 - Windows 7: 8 bits of randomness for DLLs
 - aligned to 64K page in a 16MB region \Rightarrow 256 choices
 - Windows 8: 24 bits of randomness on 64-bit processors
- Other randomization methods:
 - Sys-call randomization: randomize sys-call id's
 - Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)

ASLR Example

Booting twice loads libraries into different locations:

ntlanman.dll	0x6D7F0000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75370000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6F2C0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x76160000	Microsoft OLE for Windows

ntlanman.dll	0x6DA90000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75660000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6D9D0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x763C0000	Microsoft OLE for Windows


Note: everything in process memory must be randomized stack, heap, shared libs, base image

• Win 8 Force ASLR: ensures all loaded modules use ASLR

More attacks : JiT spraying

Idea: 1. Force Javascript JiT to fill heap with executable shellcode

2. then point SFP anywhere in spray area






Control Hijacking Defenses

Hardening the executable

Run time checking: StackGuard

- Many run-time checking techniques ...
 - we only discuss methods relevant to overflow protection
- <u>Solution 1</u>: StackGuard
 - Run time tests for stack integrity.
 - Embed "canaries" in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return.



Canary Types


- <u>Random canary:</u>
 - Random string chosen at program startup.
 - Insert canary string into every stack frame.
 - Verify canary before returning from function.
 - Exit program if canary changed. Turns potential exploit into DoS.
 - To corrupt, attacker must learn current random string.
- <u>Terminator canary</u>: Canary = {0, newline, linefeed, EOF}
 - String functions will not copy beyond terminator.
 - Attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.

StackGuard (Cont.)

- StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch
 - Program must be recompiled
- Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache
- Note: Canaries do not provide full protection
 - Some stack smashing attacks leave canaries unchanged
- Heap protection: PointGuard
 - Protects function pointers and setjmp buffers by encrypting them:
 e.g. XOR with random cookie
 - Less effective, more noticeable performance effects

StackGuard enhancements: ProPolice

- ProPolice (IBM) gcc 3.4.1. (-fstack-protector)
 - Rearrange stack layout to prevent ptr overflow.



MS Visual Studio /GS [since 2003]

Compiler /GS option:

- Combination of ProPolice and Random canary.
- If cookie mismatch, default behavior is to call __exit(3)

Function prolog:	Function
<pre>sub esp, 8 // allocate 8 bytes for cookie</pre>	mov
mov eax, DWORD PTRsecurity_cookie	xor
xor eax, esp // xor cookie with current esp	call (
mov DWORD PTR [esp+8], eax // save in stack	add

```
      Function epilog:

      mov ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+8]

      xor ecx, esp


      call @__security_check_cookie@4

      add esp, 8
```

Enhanced /GS in Visual Studio 2010:

- /GS protection added to all functions, unless can be proven unnecessary

/GS stack frame




Evading /GS with exception handlers

• When exception is thrown, dispatcher walks up exception list until handler is found (else use default handler)

After overflow: handler points to attacker's code exception triggered \Rightarrow control hijack

Main point: exception is triggered before canary is checked



Defenses: SAFESEH and SEHOP

- /SAFESEH: linker flag
 - Linker produces a binary with a table of safe exception handlers
 - System will not jump to exception handler not on list


- /SEHOP: platform defense (since win vista SP1)
 - Observation: SEH attacks typically corrupt the "next" entry in SEH list.
 - SEHOP: add a dummy record at top of SEH list
 - When exception occurs, dispatcher walks up list and verifies dummy record is there. If not, terminates process.

Summary: Canaries are not full proof


- Canaries are an important defense tool, but do not prevent all control hijacking attacks:
 - Heap-based attacks still possible
 - Integer overflow attacks still possible
 - /GS by itself does not prevent Exception Handling attacks (also need SAFESEH and SEHOP)

What if can't recompile: Libsafe

- <u>Solution 2</u>: Libsafe (Avaya Labs)
 - Dynamically loaded library (no need to recompile app.)
 - Intercepts calls to strcpy (dest, src)
 - Validates sufficient space in current stack frame: [frame-pointer – dest] > strlen(src)
 - If so, does strcpy. Otherwise, terminates application



How robust is Libsafe?



strcpy() can overwrite a pointer between buf and sfp.

More methods ...

StackShield

- At function prologue, copy return address RET and SFP to "safe" location (beginning of data segment)
- Upon return, check that RET and SFP is equal to copy.
- Implemented as assembler file processor (GCC)
- Control Flow Integrity (CFI)
 - A combination of static and dynamic checking
 - Statically determine program control flow
 - Dynamically enforce control flow integrity


Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)

Poor man's version of CFI:

• Protects indirect calls by checking against a bitmask of all valid function entry points in executable

re	ep stos	sd	
		esi, [esi] ecx, esi ; Target	 ensures target is the entry point of a
pu	ush	1	function
		<pre>@_guard_check_icall@4 ; _guard_check_icall(x) esi</pre>	
ar	dd	esp, 4	
XC	or	eax, eax	

Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)





Control Hijacking


Advanced Hijacking Attacks

Heap Spray Attacks

A reliable method for exploiting heap overflows

Heap-based control hijacking

• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)




• Suppose vtable is on the heap next to a string object:



Heap-based control hijacking


• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)



A reliable exploit?

```
<SCRIPT language="text/javascript">
shellcode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%...");
overflow-string = unescape("%u2332%u4276%...");
cause-overflow(overflow-string); // overflow buf[]
</SCRIPT>
```

Problem: attacker does not know where browser places **shellcode** on the heap




Heap Spraying [SkyLined 2004]

Idea:

use Javascript to spray heap with shellcode (and NOP slides)

2. then point vtable ptr anywhere in spray area



heap


Javascript heap spraying

```
var nop = unescape("%u9090%u9090")
while (nop.length < 0x100000) nop += nop
var shellcode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%...");
var x = new Array ()
for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
    x[i] = nop + shellcode;
}</pre>
```

• Pointing func-ptr almost anywhere in heap will cause shellcode to execute.

Vulnerable buffer placement

- Placing vulnerable **buf[256]** next to object O:
 - By sequence of Javascript allocations and frees make heap look as follows:



- Allocate vuln. buffer in Javascript and cause overflow
- Successfully used against a Safari PCRE overflow [DHM'08]


Many heap spray exploits

Date	Browser	Description	[RLZ'08]
11/2004	IE	IFRAME Tag BO	
04/2005	IE	DHTML Objects Corruption	
01/2005	IE	.ANI Remote Stack BO	
07/2005	IE	javaprxy.dll COM Object	
03/2006	IE	createTextRang RE	
$09^{\prime}/2006$	IE	VML Remote BO	
03/2007	IE	ADODB Double Free	
09/2006	IE	$WebViewFolderIcon \ \texttt{setSlice}$	
09/2005	\mathbf{FF}	0xAD Remote Heap BO	
12/2005	\mathbf{FF}	compareTo() RE	
07/2006	\mathbf{FF}	Navigator Object RE	
07/2008	Safari	Quicktime Content-Type BO	-

- Improvements: Heap Feng Shui [s'07]
 - Reliable heap exploits **on IE** without spraying
 - Gives attacker full control of IE heap from Javascript

(partial) Defenses

- Protect heap function pointers (e.g. PointGuard)
- Better browser architecture:
 - Store JavaScript strings in a separate heap from browser heap
- OpenBSD heap overflow protection:



• Nozzle [RLZ'08]: detect sprays by prevalence of code on heap

References on heap spraying

- [1] Heap Feng Shui in Javascript, by A. Sotirov, *Blackhat Europe* 2007
- [2] Engineering Heap Overflow Exploits with JavaScript M. Daniel, J. Honoroff, and C. Miller, *WooT* 2008
- [3] Nozzle: A Defense Against Heap-spraying Code Injection Attacks, by P. Ratanaworabhan, B. Livshits, and B. Zorn
- [4] Interpreter Exploitation: Pointer inference and JiT spraying, by Dion Blazakis

End of Segment