


Lecture 4: ^{Zero} Knowledge

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Plan

April 10, 2019

- Recap: Interactive proofs
- Zero Knowledge
 - * What it is
 - * Why it's useful
 - * How we define it
- Example: ZK Proof for HAMCYCLE

Reminders

- HW 1 due Friday at 5pm via Gradescope
 - ↳ Come to OH today!
- Late day policy

Today

- We will be discussing the most beautiful idea in all of CS. Maybe of all time?
 - ↳ Controversial but still true!
- Zero Knowledge - How to prove to you that I know something (e.g. ϕ is SAT) without leaking anything else to you (SAT assignment)
- Amazingly clever, also useful in many crypto protocols.
- Lesson: Importance of definitions.
 - Original ZK paper is important b/c of defn of ZK, not because of the specific constructions.
 - ↳ Defn is $> \frac{1}{2}$ the bottle
- Paper rejected 3 (I think) times before published
 - ↳ Lesson?
 - Goldwasser, Micali, Rackoff (STOC '85)

Recap: Interactive proofs

On Monday, Florian introduced interactive proofs

Goal of a proof: Convince someone of something
"the verifier" "statement"

In complexity theory, we consider statements of the form:

" $x \in \mathcal{L}$ "
instance language

Examples: "N is the product of exactly two primes

$$N \in \{pq \mid \text{primes } p, q\}$$

"The Pythagorean Thm is true."


$$\text{PYTHM} \in \{ \text{true statements in some formal system} \}$$

" ϕ is an unsatisfiable SAT formula"

$$\phi \in \{ \text{set of unsatisfiable SAT instances} \}$$

Recap

Conventional Proof



- π might be hard to find (exponential time)
- π should be easy to check (polynomial time, *deterministic verifier*)

Say that we want to prove that $x \in L$.


Can do so w/
a conventional
proof

\iff L is an NP
language

e.g. to prove that ϕ is SAT, P sends satisfying assignment to V.

Blum NP = "nifty proof"

Recap What if we allow P & V to interact?
 What if V can use randomness?



Can increase to 1.

Properties we want

1. Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L} \quad \Pr[\langle P, V \rangle(x) = \text{"accept"}] \geq \frac{2}{3}$

2. Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L} \quad \forall P^* \quad \Pr[\langle P^*, V \rangle(x) = \text{"accept"}] \leq \frac{1}{3}$

Can reduce to negligible w/ repetition.

Q: Why is interaction useful?

A1: (On Monday)

IP captures a larger class of problems.
↳ PSPACE ... prove to you that a graph is NOT 3-COLORABLE!

A2: (Today)

Interactive proofs can have a third surprising property.

Properties we want

3. Zero Knowledge

V "learns nothing" from her interaction with P , except that $x \in L$.


↑ Huh? What does this even mean?

Application: Can prove to you that I executed some protocol correctly without revealing any of my secrets.

Defn of ZK used to define security in many protocols
↳ want to show that "nothing leaks"


Q: What does it mean to "learn nothing" from an interaction?

Ex. Me in 7th grade



Ex. Military spokes person.

INTUITION: If V can easily write down a transcript of its interaction with P , then V hasn't learned anything useful from P .



If you can simulate the conversation transcripts, no need to have it at all!

↳ Applications in real life?

The surprising thing is that there is a very clean way to formalize this intuition

3. Zero Knowledge: \forall efficient V, V^*, \exists efficient Sim
 s.t. $\forall x \in \mathcal{I}$


$$\{ \text{View}_{V^*}[P(x) \leftrightarrow V^*(x)] \} \approx \{ \text{Sim}(x) \}$$

There are diff flavors of ZK

- perfect =
- statistical \approx_s
- computational \approx_c

Intuition:

- Whatever V can learn by interacting w/ P , it can learn sitting at home by running Sim.
- Holds even if V^* is malicious.



- Key to remember: Input to Sim essentially captures what the (P, V) interaction leaks.

There is an annoying technical issue that comes up when you want to run a ZK protocol many times.
 → "Auxiliary-input ZK"
 See Goldreich § 4.3.3

ZK Protocol for Hamiltonian Cycle [Blum '87 (?)]


- HamCycle is an NP-Complete problem
 - ↳ Anything provable (in NP) is provable in ZK
 - ↳ Reduce to HamCycle instance, use this protocol.

{ Goldreich
Micali
Wigderson '87

In theory, can prove to you that I know an Obby in iOS without revealing it to you! And so on....

Reminder: Defn of Ham Cycle

$G = (V, E)$ undirected graph



Cycle in graph that visits each vertex once

See Knuth (linked from course website) for fun history of this problem.


$$\text{HAMCYCLE} = \{ G \mid G \text{ has a Hamiltonian cycle} \}$$

Adjacency Matrix

$$A = \begin{array}{c|cccccc} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\ \hline 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 4 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 5 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 6 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array}$$

$$A_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (i,j) \in E(G) \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$$

Trivial Protocol



Not
Zero Knowledge
(under reasonable assumptions...)

ZK Protocol (Blum)

Following Blum, we'll imagine that P can send V "locked boxes," which we implement w/ cryptographic commitments.

Prover (G)

- * Put each of the n vertices v_1, \dots, v_n into n boxes B_1, \dots, B_n in random order.
- * Into box B_{ij} , put $\begin{cases} 1 & \text{if vertices in } B_i \text{ and } B_j \\ & \text{are adjacent in } G \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$

B_i 's = relabeling of vertices

B_{ij} 's = adj. matrix under relabeling

Send the $n + \binom{n}{2}$ boxes

→ Flip a coin $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

If $b=0$: "Show me G !"

If $b=1$: "Show me the cycle!"

←

If $b=0$: Unlock all boxes.

If $b=1$: Unlock only boxes corresponding to Ham Cycle in G .
Keys


Check:

$b=0$ Got a perm of adj. matrix

$b=1$ Got a cycle

Accept if so.

Some Comments



Properties

1. Complete. ✓
2. Sound.
If $G \notin \text{HamCycle}$, then no matter what P^* puts in boxes, V will reject w.p. $\geq 1/2$.
3. Zero knowledge. We construct eff Sim.

Sim($G \in \text{HamCycle}$)

- Guess $\hat{b} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
- If $\hat{b} = 0$, put random perm of Adj mat in Boxes
- If $\hat{b} = 1$, put random perm of cycle in Boxes.
- Run $b \leftarrow V^*(G, \text{Boxes})$
- If $b \neq \hat{b}$, Abort.
- Else, open boxes per V^* 's request
- Output $(G, \text{Boxes}, b, \text{Keys to boxes})$ as transcript.

N.B. When we replace ideal box w/ a real commitment, we get a protocol that is only computational Zk.

Life lessons to remember

* If you can ^{efficiently} simulate an interaction, you haven't learned anything useful from it.
↳ Ideally doesn't apply to this lecture.

* Input to simulator \Leftarrow what leaks.

* Anything that has a traditional (NP) proof also has a zero knowledge proof system.