CS 355: Topics in Cryptography **Spring 2020**

Problem Set 2

Due: May 4, 2020 at 11:59pm

Instructions: You **must** typeset your solution in LaTeX using the provided template:

https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs355/20sp/homework.tex

Submission Instructions: You must submit your problem set via Gradescope. Note that Gradescope requires that the solution to each problem starts on a **new page**.

Bugs: We make mistakes! If it looks like there might be a mistake in the statement of a problem, please ask a clarifying question on Piazza.

Note: The following two documents may help with number theory background on this assignment.

1. https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/cs255/handouts/numth1.pdf
2. https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/cs255/handouts/numth2.pdf

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Problem 1: Conceptual Questions [10 points]. For each of the following statements, say whether it is TRUE or FALSE. Write *at most one sentence* to justify your answer.

(a) Let p, q, r, and r' be distinct large primes. Let $N = pqr$ and $N' = pqr'$. Assume that there does *not* exist an efficient (probabilistic polynomial time) factoring algorithm. Say whether each of the following statements are TRUE or FALSE.

i There is an efficient algorithm that takes N as input and outputs r.

ii There is an efficient algorithm that takes N and N' as input and outputs r.

iii There is an efficient algorithm that takes N and N' as input and outputs q.

(b) Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a cyclic group of prime order q with a generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and $H\colon \mathbb{G} \to \{1,2,3\}$ be a random function. A walk on $\mathbb{G}$ defined as $x_0 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$ and $x_{i+1} \leftarrow x_i \cdot g^{H(x_i)}$ collides in $O(\sqrt{q})$ steps in expectation (i.e., if $i_{\text{col}} = \min\{i \in \mathbb{N}\colon \exists j < i \text{ s.t. } x_i = x_j\}$, then $\mathbb{E}_{x_0,H}[i_{\text{col}}] \leq O(\sqrt{q})$).

(c) Let $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be a pairing for an elliptic curve group $\mathbb{G}$. If the discrete log problem in $\mathbb{G}$ is easy, then the BDDH problem for e is easy as well.

Problem 2: Coppersmith Attacks on RSA [15 points]. In this problem, we will explore what are known as "Coppersmith" attacks on RSA-style cryptosystems. As you will see, these attacks are very powerful and very general. We will use the following theorem:

Theorem (Coppersmith, Howgrave-Graham, May)**.** Let N be an integer of unknown factorization. Let p be a divisor of N such that $p \geq N^\beta$ for some constant $0 < \beta \leq 1$. Let $f \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]$ be a monic polynomial of degree δ. Then there is an efficient algorithm that outputs all integers x such that

$$f(x) = 0 \bmod p \qquad \text{and} \qquad |x| \leq N^{\beta^2/\delta}.$$

Here $|x| \leq B$ indicates that $x \in \{-B, \ldots, -1, 0, 1, \ldots, B\}$.

In the statement of the theorem, when we write $f \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]$, we mean that f is a polynomial in an indeterminate x with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_N$. A *monic* polynomial is one whose leading coefficient is 1.

When $N = pq$ is an RSA modulus (where p and q are random primes of equal bit-length with $p > q$), the interesting instantiations of the theorem have either $\beta = 1/2$ (i.e., we are looking for solutions modulo a prime factor of N) or $\beta = 1$ (i.e., we are looking for small solutions modulo N).

For this problem, let N be an RSA modulus with $\gcd(\phi(N), 3) = 1$ and let $F_{\text{RSA}}(m) := m^3 \pmod N$ be the RSA one-way function.

(a) Let $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$. Show that you can factor an RSA modulus $N = pq$ if you are given:

- the low-order $n/3$ bits of p,
- the high-order $n/3$ bits of p, or
- the high-end $n/6$ bits of p *and* the low-end $n/6$ bits of p.

(b) In the dark ages of cryptography, people would encrypt messages directly using F_{RSA}. That is, they would encrypt an arbitrary bitstring $m \in \{0,1\}^{\lfloor \log_2 N \rfloor / 5}$ by

- setting $M \leftarrow 2^\ell + m$ for some integer ℓ to make $N/2 \leq M < N$, and
- computing the ciphertext as $c \leftarrow F_{\text{RSA}}(M)$.

(Note that the first step corresponds to padding the message M by prepending it with a binary string "$10000\cdots000$.")

Show that this public-key encryption scheme is very broken. In particular, give an efficient algorithm that takes as input (N, c) and outputs m.

(c) To avoid the problem with the padding scheme above, your friend proposes instead encrypting the short message $m \in \{0,1\}^{\lfloor \log_2 N \rfloor / 5}$ by setting $M \leftarrow (m \| m \| m \| m \| m) \in \{0,1\}^{\lfloor \log_2 N \rfloor}$ and outputting $c \leftarrow F_{\text{RSA}}(M)$. Show that this "fix" is still broken.

(d) The RSA-FDH signature scheme uses a hash function $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_N$. The signature on a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ is the value $\sigma \leftarrow F_{\text{RSA}}^{-1}(H(m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. The signature σ is $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$ bits long. Show that the signer need only output signatures of $2n/3$ bits while still

- retaining exactly the same level of security (i.e., using the same size modulus), and
- having the verifier run in polynomial time.[1]

[1] We don't use this optimization in practice since (1) Schnorr signatures are so much shorter and (2) the verification time here is polynomial, but still much larger than the normal RSA-FDH verification time. Still, it's a cool trick to know.

Problem 3: On The Importance of Elliptic-Curve Point Validation [10 points]. In this problem, we will see that all parties in a cryptographic protocol must verify that adversarially chosen points are on the right curve, and failing to do so may break security. We exemplify this by considering a variant of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange in which the server uses the same key pair across multiple sessions. More specifically, let $E\colon y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$ be an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $q := |E(\mathbb{F}_p)|$ is a prime number and $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ is a generator. The server holds a *fixed* secret key $\alpha \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and advertises (e.g., in its TLS certificate) the corresponding fixed public key $\alpha P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. A client connects to the server by choosing $\beta \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, computing $V = \beta P$, and sending V to the server. Both sides then compute the shared secret $W = \alpha\beta P$. For simplicity, we assume that the server then sends the message $E_s(W, \text{“Hello!”})$ to the client, where (E_s, D_s) is some symmetric cipher.

(a) Explain how the server can check that the point V it receives from the client is indeed in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

The elliptic-curve group addition formulae are *independent of the parameter B* of the curve equation. In particular, for every curve $\hat{E}\colon y^2 = x^3 + Ax + \hat{B}$ for some $\hat{B} \in \mathbb{F}_p$, applying the formulae for addition in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ to any two points $\hat{V}, \hat{W} \in \hat{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ gives the point $\hat{V} \boxplus \hat{W} \in \hat{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

(b) Suppose there exists a curve $\hat{E}\colon y^2 = x^3 + Ax + \hat{B}$ such that $|\hat{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)|$ is divisible by a small prime t (i.e., $t = O(\text{polylog}(q))$). Show that if the server *does not check* that $V \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$, a malicious client can efficiently learn $\alpha \bmod t$. You may assume one can efficiently find a point of order t in $\hat{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

(c) Use Part (b) to show how a malicious client can efficiently learn the secret key α, if the server *does not check* that $V \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. You may assume that if $\hat{B} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{F}_p$, then $|\hat{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)|$ is uniform in $\left[p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p}, p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}\right]$ and is efficiently computable. (As in Part (b), you may assume that whenever the order of a curve has a small prime factor t, one can efficiently find a point of order t on that curve.)

Problem 4: Somewhat-homomorphic encryption from pairings [10 points]. In this problem, you will construct a “somewhat homomorphic” public-key encryption scheme: it allows computing any number of additions and a single multiplication. Let $\mathbb{G}_1$ be a cyclic group of prime order p and $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$ be a generator of the group. Consider the following two algorithms:

$\mathsf{Gen}(g) \to (\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk})$: Choose random $a, b, c \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $c \neq ab \pmod p$. Set $g_a = g^a$, $g_b = g^b$, and $g_c = g^c$. Output the public key $\mathsf{pk} = (g, g_a, g_b, g_c)$ and the secret key $\mathsf{sk} = (a, b, c)$.

$\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk} = (g, g_a, g_b, g_c), m) \to \mathsf{ct}$: Given a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, choose $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and output $\mathsf{ct} = (g^m g_a^r, g_b^m g_c^r)$.

(a) Give a Dec algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext $\mathsf{ct} = (u, v)$ and outputs m. Your algorithm needs to be efficient only if the message m lies in some known small space (say $0 \le m < B$ as an integer, for some bound $B = O(\text{polylog}(p))$).

(b) Give an algorithm $\mathsf{Add}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{ct}, \mathsf{ct}') \to \mathsf{ct}_{\text{sum}}$ that takes as input two ciphertexts ct and ct', that are encryptions of $m, m' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ respectively, and outputs an encryption of $m + m' \bmod p$.

Now let $\mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ be two other cyclic groups of order p (i.e., $|\mathbb{G}_1| = |\mathbb{G}_2| = |\mathbb{G}_T|$), $e\colon \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be a pairing, and $h \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $e(g, h) \in \mathbb{G}_T$ be generators of $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ respectively. Furthermore, let $(\mathsf{pk}', \mathsf{sk}') \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(h)$ be the public and secret keys obtained by running Gen using the group $\mathbb{G}_2$. Consider now the following algorithm:

$\mathsf{Mult}(\mathsf{ct}, \mathsf{ct}')$: On input two ciphertexts $\mathsf{ct} = (u, v) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m)$ and $\mathsf{ct}' = (u', v') \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}', m')$, output the tuple $(w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4) \in \mathbb{G}_T^4$ where

$$w_1 = e(u, u'), \quad w_2 = e(u, v'), \quad w_3 = e(v, u'), \quad w_4 = e(v, v').$$

(c) Let $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_4 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $w_i = e(g, h)^{\alpha_i}$ (i.e., α_i is the discrete log of w_i in $\mathbb{G}_T$). Show that $m \cdot m' \bmod p$ can be expressed as a *linear function* $\sum_{i=1}^{4} C_i \alpha_i$, where the coefficients C_i depend only on the secret keys. (You *need not* give an explicit formula for the coefficients C_i.)

(d) Show how to efficiently recover $m \cdot m' \bmod p$ from $w_1, \ldots, w_4$ and the two secret keys sk and sk'. As in Part (a), you can assume that the messages m, m' lie in some known small space.

(e) **Extra credit [3 points].** Show that if the DDH assumption holds in $\mathbb{G}_1$ then $\mathcal{E} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme.

Problem 5: Time Spent [3 points for answering]. How long did you spend on this problem set? This is for calibration purposes, and the response you provide will not affect your score.

Optional Feedback [0 points]. Please answer the following questions to help us design future problem sets. You do not need to answer these questions, and if you would prefer to answer anonymously, please use this form. However, we do encourage you to provide us feedback on how to improve the course experience.

(a) What was your favorite problem on this problem set? Why?

(b) What was your least favorite problem on this problem set? Why?

(c) Do you have any other feedback for this problem set?

(d) Do you have any other feedback on the course so far?