

Time / Space Tradeoffs for Symmetric Cryptanalysis

DES block cipher - developed by IBM (initially key was 64 bits)

→ NSA try to convince IBM to reduce key size to 48 bits to enable brute force

→ Eventually compromised on 56-bit design

Question: What is the cost of breaking DES? Let N denote number of keys.

Exhaustive search: given several message-ciphertext pairs, try all of the keys

Classically:

$$T \cdot S \geq N$$

$$\text{time complexity: } O(N)$$

$$\text{space complexity: } O(1)$$

→ e.g. CPA attack

Quantum (lower bound): Table lookup: suppose we have known message-ciphertext pair and precomputed table of all key.

$$T^2 \cdot S \geq N$$


$$\text{time complexity: } O(\log N)$$

$$\text{space complexity: } O(N)$$

in we give a
construction for
this? Tighter lower
bound?

More general problem: inverting a one-way function (permutation)

→ Hellman introduced notion of time-memory tradeoff with Hellman tables (C3255)



Key observation: suppose all elements in table are distinct

→ success probability of inverting OWF on random input is $\frac{m^t}{N}$

→ compare with exhaustive search: $\frac{1}{N}$ and table lookup: $\frac{m^t}{N}$

→ Constant fraction overlaps ⇒ success prob. reduced by same constant factor

How much overlap should we expect in the table entries? Suppose f is modeled as a random function. How much of the domain can we expect to cover?

Let X_{ij} denote the $(i, j)^{\text{th}}$ entry in the table. Let A be the set of values in the table. Then:

$$|A| = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{t+1} I\{X_{ij} \text{ is new}\}$$

$$\Pr[X \in A] = \frac{E[|A|]}{N} \approx \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{t+1} e^{-ijt/N}$$

$$\text{Now, } E[|A|] = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^t \Pr[X_{ij} \text{ is new}] \quad (\text{linearity of expectation, expectation of indicator})$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[X_{ij} \text{ is new}] &\geq \Pr[X_{ii}, \dots, X_{ij} \text{ are all new}] \quad (\text{all elements in row are new}) \\ &= \Pr[X_{ii} \text{ is new}] \Pr[X_{i2} \text{ is new} | X_{ii} \text{ is new}] \dots \Pr[X_{ij} \text{ is new} | X_{ii} \dots X_{i,j-1} \text{ is new}] \\ &= \frac{N - |A_i|}{N} \times \frac{N - |A_i| - 1}{N} \times \dots \times \frac{N - |A_i| - j + 1}{N} \quad |A_i| \text{ is new elements in first } i \text{ rows} \\ &\geq \left(\frac{N - it}{N}\right)^j \\ \therefore \Pr[x \in A] &\geq \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^t \left(\frac{N - it}{N}\right)^j = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^t \left(1 - \frac{it}{N}\right)^{\frac{N-j}{N}} \approx \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^t e^{-\frac{it}{N}} \end{aligned}$$

Not much gained when $mt^2 \gg N$ (contribution very small) \rightarrow setting $m = t = \sqrt{N}$ not sufficient (too many collisions)

\Rightarrow set $m = t = N^{1/3}$ \Rightarrow succeed w.p. $\approx N^{-1/3}$

\hookrightarrow construct $N^{1/3}$ such tables to succeed with constant prob.

\Rightarrow time $N^{2/3}$, space $N^{2/3}$ - 56-bit DES \Rightarrow 38-bits effective security (\$10 cost in 1978)

What if we could use $O(N)$ space during precomputation?

\hookrightarrow construct table of size $O(\sqrt{N})$ to allow online inversion in time $O(\sqrt{N})$

What if f is a permutation (with a single cycle)? - discrete log

\hookrightarrow again admits a \sqrt{N}, \sqrt{N} time-memory trade-off

Double DES and Meet-in-the Middle Attacks

Double DES : $\text{DES}_2((k_1, k_2), x) : \text{DES}(k_2, \text{DES}(k_1, x))$ looks like 112-bit keys

time-memory tradeoff (with known plaintext m)

- (pre)-compute table $\text{DES}(k, m)$ for all keys k , (size 2^{56})

- given ciphertext c , evaluate $\text{DES}^{-1}(k_2, c)$ for all k_2

$$c = \text{DES}(k_2, \text{DES}(k_1, x))$$

$$\text{DES}^{-1}(k_2, c) = \text{DES}(k_1, x) \quad (\text{time } 2^{56})$$



2^{57} -cost attack

What if we have only $w < 2^{56}$ memory

↪ then partition the space into blocks of size w and repeat attack for each block

↪ requires $(\frac{N}{w})(w+N) = N + \frac{N^2}{w}$ time and w space

Another approach: reduce meet-in-the-middle to a collision search problem (reduce space requirements)

Meet in the middle attack: find (k_1, k_2) such that

$$\underbrace{\text{DES}^{-1}(k_2, c)}_{f_2(k_2)} = \underbrace{\text{DES}(k_1, m)}_{f_1(k_1)}$$

Define a function $f(k, i) = f_i(k)$ observe that

\uparrow \uparrow
key index

$f(k_2, 2) = f(k_1, 1)$ which is a collision for f

↑ goal: build collision finding algorithm
(also independently important)

Abstract goal: suppose we have a function $f: S \rightarrow S$ and we want to find a collision

- Naive strategy: compute $f(x_1), \dots, f(x_m)$ for random x_1, \dots, x_m until collision is found

↪ birthday bound: time $O(\sqrt{N})$ and space $O(\sqrt{N})$

- Using a cycle finding algorithm: "rho method"

start with random x and compute

$$x, f(x), f(f(x)), \dots, f^{(m)}(x)$$


if f looks like a random function, then after \sqrt{N} applications, will have a collision (e.g., cycle)

- Cycle detection via fast pointer / slow pointer [Floyd]

choose random $x_0 = x'_0$ and compute

$$x_i \leftarrow f(x_{i-1})$$

$$x'_i \leftarrow f(f(x'_{i-1}))$$



- How to go from distinguished point to collision:

1. Compute length of cycle $O(\sqrt{N})$ time

2. Advance further pointer until it is equidistant from the distinguished point


3. Advance both pointers in sync - will collide at some position

Rho algorithm: $O(\sqrt{N})$ time, $O(1)$ space for finding collisions

- Naive parallel extension to rho algorithm does not provide compelling speed-up
- Suppose we have m processors each running independent execution of rho algorithm
 - After each processor has evaluated f a total of k times, probability there is no collision
$$\left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{k-1}{N}\right) \right]^m \leq \left(1 - \frac{k}{N}\right)^{mk} \approx e^{-k^2 m / N}$$
 - \hookrightarrow expression is for single processor finding collision over domain of size N/m
 - Collision after $k = \sqrt{N}/m$ steps \Rightarrow only \sqrt{m} speed-up despite m processors

Parallel collision search: getting linear speedup from multiple processors [van Oorschot and Wiener]

- each processor chooses a random point and evaluates f until hitting a "distinguished" point



- observation: after $O(\sqrt{N})$ total points, there will be a collision
 - \Rightarrow after each processor has taken $O(\sqrt{N}/m)$ steps
- choose distinguished points so trails expected to be long - will not require too much space
- gives collision-finding algorithm with small space!