

Lecture 3: Number-Theoretic Cryptography

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- Two ways to build crypto schemes:
 - 1) Use assumptions (e.g. factoring is hard)
 - 2) Change the model
- Even-Mansour Cipher
 - Uses random permutation model
 - All parties have access to Π/Π^{-1} random permutations
 - In practice, $\hat{\Pi}$ is coded into standard
 Even-Mansour security proof (used hybrid argument)
 - Game 0: Real attack game (adversary talks to EM cipher)
 - Game 1: Rephrasing
 - Game 2: Ideal World (adversary talks to random/ideal cipher)
- Time/space Tradeoffs (Hellman Tables)
 - ”Inverting a function with advice”
 - $[N] : \{1, \dots, N\} : 2^n$
 - Given: $f : [N] \rightarrow [N]$,
 - $y \in [N]$,
 - s bits of ”advice” \rightarrow precomputation
 - Task: find $x \in [N]$ such that $y = f(x)$
 - Theorem (Hellman): With $s \in \mathcal{O}(N^{2/3})$ bits of advice, can invert f in time $\mathcal{O}(N^{2/3})$
 - \Rightarrow Inverting DES takes $\approx 2^{40}$ time (keys: 2^{56})
- Collision Finding

• Meet in the Middle	space: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$	time: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$
• Rho Method	space: $\mathcal{O}(1)$	time: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$
• Parallel Rho (P processors)	space: $\mathcal{O}(1)$ (per processor)	time: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N}/P)$

RSA

- First public key encryption and digital signatures
- RSA assumptions have more structure than other assumptions
- Going out of style
 - Quantum algorithms can break all assumptions
 - Large keys (λ^3 -bit keys \approx 4096 bits)

A Survey of Hard Problems (Related to RSA)

Factoring

Sample $p, q \xleftarrow{R} \{\lambda\text{-bit primes}\}$

$$N \leftarrow p \cdot q$$

Given N , produce (p, q)

Best attack: $e^{\mathcal{O}(\lambda^{1/3} \cdot (\log \lambda)^{2/3})} \notin$ polynomial time
 $\ll 2^\lambda$

General Number Field Sieve (Pollard 1988)

RSA- e (e is an Odd Prime)

Sample $p, q \xleftarrow{R} \{\lambda\text{-bit primes}\}$

$$\gcd(e, p-1) = 1, \gcd(e, q-1) = 1$$

$$N \leftarrow p \cdot q$$

$$x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$$

$$a \leftarrow x^e \in \mathbb{Z}_N$$

Given (N, a) produce x

often: $e = 3, e = 65537$

"Taking e^{th} roots mod N is hard without the factors of N "

Strong RSA Problem

Sample $p, q \xleftarrow{R} \{\lambda\text{-bit primes}\}$

$$\gcd(e, p-1) = 1, \gcd(e, q-1) = 1$$

$$N \leftarrow p \cdot q$$

$$a \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N$$

Given (N, a) produce (x, e) such that

$$a = x^e \in \mathbb{Z}_N \text{ and}$$

$$e \neq \pm 1$$

Hardness

Factoring \geq RSA- $e \geq$ Strong-RSA

RSA- e has unique answer

Strong-RSA has exponential answers

Random Self Reduction

For a given modulus N , we'd like that computing $a^{1/e} \bmod N$ is hard for "almost all" $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.
"Hard on average"

We know that for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, computing $a^{1/e} \bmod N$ is easy!

→ $a = 1$, numbers with cube roots over the integers

We can show that either:

a) finding $a^{1/e} \bmod N$ is hard for "almost all" $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ or

b) finding $a^{1/e} \bmod N$ is easy everywhere

Claim:

Say there exists an efficient algorithm \mathcal{A}_N such that

$$\Pr_{a \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N} [\mathcal{A}_N(a) = a^{1/e} \in \mathbb{Z}_N] = \epsilon$$

then there exists an efficient algorithm \mathcal{B}_N such that for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$

$$\Pr_{\text{random coins of } \mathcal{B}_N} [\mathcal{B}_N(x) = x^{1/e} \in \mathbb{Z}_N] = \epsilon$$

Proof.

$$\mathcal{B}_N(x) \{ \begin{array}{l} r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N \\ y \leftarrow \mathbb{A}_N(x \cdot r^e) \\ z \leftarrow y \cdot r^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_N \\ \text{if } z^e \neq x: \text{ output "fail"} \\ \text{else} \quad \text{output } z \end{array} \}$$

$$\Pr[\overline{\text{fail}}] = \Pr_a[\mathcal{A}_N(a) = a^{1/e} \in \mathbb{Z}_N] = \epsilon \blacksquare$$

– caveat: only works for some N

Crypto from Factoring

Trapdoor One-Way Function

$$\begin{aligned} (pk, sk) &\leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ y &\leftarrow F(pk, x) \quad x \in \mathcal{X}, y \in \mathcal{Y} \\ x &\leftarrow F^{-1}(sk, y) \end{aligned}$$

Correctness: For all (pk, sk) from Gen ,

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{for all } x \in \mathcal{X}, \\ &F(pk, F^{-1}(sk, y)) = y \end{aligned}$$

Security: For all efficient adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\begin{aligned} TDFAdv[\mathcal{A}, F] &:= \Pr[y = F(pk, x')] \\ TDFAdv[\mathcal{A}, F] &\in \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

Rabin (1979)

At a high level, this is just RSA with $e = 2$

RSA: $x^e \bmod N$

Rabin: $x^2 \bmod N$

$(N, p) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$

$y \leftarrow F(N, x \in \mathbb{Z}_N)$

returns $x^2 \bmod N$

$x \leftarrow F^{-1}(p, y)$

returns $\sqrt{y} \bmod N$

– collisions: $(-x)^2 = x^2$

Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

Given primes p and q , $p \neq q$, and given x_p and x_q such that

$$x_p = x \bmod p$$

$$x_q = x \bmod q$$

there is an algorithm that outputs

$$x \bmod N \rightarrow x \bmod pq$$

Square Roots

Claim:

If $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, then

$$p = 4p' + 3$$

$$x = y^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \bmod p$$

is a square root of y in \mathbb{Z}_p^*

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} x^2 &= (y^{\frac{p+1}{4}})^2 = y^{\frac{p+1}{2}} = y \cdot y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \\ (\text{let } y &= r^2) &= y \cdot (r^2)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \\ &= y \cdot r^{p-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\ &= y \in \mathbb{Z}_p \blacksquare \end{aligned}$$

Also easy (not as easy) if $p \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$

If x is root of y , $(p - x)$ is also:

$$\begin{aligned} (p - x)^2 &= p^2 - 2px + x^2 \\ &= x^2 \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

→ There will be four square roots mod N if any square roots.

Rabin and Factoring

Claim:

Given an efficient algorithm \mathcal{A} that inverts Rabin's function, there exists an efficient algorithm \mathcal{B} that factors N .

We have x, x' such that

$$\begin{aligned}x^2 &= (x')^2 \pmod{N} \\x^2 - (x')^2 &= 0 \pmod{N} \\(x - x')(x + x') &= 0 \pmod{N}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{if } x = \pm x' : x - x' &= 0 \in \mathbb{Z} \\x + x' &= 0 \in \mathbb{Z}\end{aligned}$$

else ($x \neq \pm x'$) then

$$\begin{aligned}(x - x')(x + x') &= k \cdot N \\ \rightarrow \gcd(x - x', N) &\text{ gives factor of } N\end{aligned}$$

Four cases:

$$\begin{array}{lll}x = x' \pmod{p} & x = x' \pmod{q} & \rightarrow \text{not useful} \\x = x' \pmod{p} & x \neq x' \pmod{q} & \rightarrow \text{useful} \\x \neq x' \pmod{p} & x = x' \pmod{q} & \rightarrow \text{useful} \\x \neq x' \pmod{p} & x \neq x' \pmod{q} & \rightarrow \text{not useful}\end{array}$$

Another View of RSA Problems

(Rabin)

$$\begin{aligned}a &\stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N \\ \text{find a root of } f(x) &= x^2 - a \in \mathbb{Z}_N\end{aligned}$$

(RSA)

$$\begin{aligned}a &\stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N \\ \text{find a root of } f(x) &= x^e - a \in \mathbb{Z}_N\end{aligned}$$

(Crazy RSA)

$$\begin{aligned}a &\stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_N \\ \text{find a root of } f(x) &= x^7 + 4x^2 + 2x + a \in \mathbb{Z}_N\end{aligned}$$

Only (known) way to solve these without factors of N is to solve over the integers and reduce mod N