Cryptology and Physical Security: Rights Amplification in
Locks
Matt Blaze
Computer security and cryptology takes much of its basic philosophy and
language from the world of mechanical locks, and yet we often ignore the
fact that physical security systems can suffer from many of the same kinds
of attacks that plague computers and networks. This talk examines
mechanical locks from a computer scientist's viewpoint. We describe
attacks for amplifying rights in mechanical pin tumbler locks. Given
access to a single master-keyed lock and its associated change key, a
procedure is given that allows discovery and creation of a working master
key for the system. No special skill or equipment, beyond a small number
of blank keys and a metal file, is required, and the attacker need engage
in no suspicious behavior at the lock's location. We end with future
directions for research in this area, and the suggestion that mechanical
locks are worthy objects of our attention and scrutiny.
Gates 4B (opposite 490), 02/14/2003 (FRIDAY!), 4 PM