Exposing and Eliminating Vulnerabilities to Denial of Service Attacks in Secure Gossip-Based Multicast
Gal Badishi, Technion
We propose a framework and methodology for quantifying the effect of
denial of service (DoS) attacks on a distributed system. We present a
systematic study of the resistance of gossip-based multicast protocols to
DoS attacks. We show that even distributed and randomized gossip-based
protocols, which eliminate single points of failure, do not necessarily
eliminate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. We propose Drum -- a simple
gossip-based multicast protocol that eliminates such vulnerabilities. Drum
was implemented in Java and tested on a large cluster. We show, using
closed-form mathematical analysis, simulations, and empirical tests, that
Drum survives severe DoS attacks.
Joint work with Idit Keidar and Amir Sasson.
Gates 4B (opposite 490) Thursday 09/16/04 1630 hrs