Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Gil Segev, Weizmann Institute of Science
Abstract:
Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is traditionally concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture side-channel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. In light of the prevalence of side-channel attacks there have been several recent attempts to model such attacks, and to construct cryptographic schemes that are secure even against a wide range of side-channnel attacks. In this talk I will describe recent developments in the area that are inspired by the "cold boot attacks" of Halderman et al. (Usenix Security 2008), and by the framework for modelling key-leakage attacks suggested by Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC '09) in which adversarially chosen functions of the secret key are leaked to the attacker. In particular, I will present a new and simple construction of a public-key cryptosystem that is resilient to leakage of almost all the secret key, as well as a generic method for constructing leakage-resilient cryptosystems that can be based on a variety of number-theoretic assumptions. Joint work with Moni Naor.