Rozzle: De-Cloaking Internet Malware with Multi-Execution
While static and runtime methods for malware detection been proposed
in the literature, both on the client side, for just-in-time
in-browser detection, as well as offline, crawler-based malware
discovery, these approaches encounter the same fundamental limitation.
Web-based malware tends to be environment-specific, targeting a
particular browser, often attacking specific versions of installed
plugins. This targeting occurs because the malware exploits
vulnerabilities in specific plugins and fail otherwise. As a result, a
fundamental limitation for detecting a piece of malware is that
malware is triggered infrequently, only showing itself when the right
environment is present. In fact, we observe that using current
fingerprinting techniques, just about any piece of existing malware
may be made virtually undetectable with the current generation of
Ben has published papers at PLDI, POPL, Oakland Security, Usenix Security, CCS, SOSP, ICSE, FSE, and many other venues. He is known for his work in software reliability and especially tools to improve software security, with a primary focus on approaches to finding buffer overruns in C programs and a variety of security vulnerabilities (cross-site scripting, SQL injections, etc.) in Web-based applications. He is the author of several dozen academic papers and patents. Lately he has been focusing on how Web 2.0 application and browser reliability, performance, and security can be improved through a combination of static and runtime techniques. Ben generally does not speak of himself in the third person.