


Day 8: Proof-of-Work (building a secure ledger)



Today

1 Recap

2 Blocks

3 Proof-of-Work (PoW)

4 Hash Chains / Block Chain

1 Recap:

• Last time,

Public Ledger \longrightarrow Payment System

• Unresolved questions:

• How is money created?

• How is scarcity enforced?

• How do we ensure consensus? \leftarrow related

• How do we ensure the append-only property?

• How do we incentivize people to maintain/store the ledger? \uparrow to make something in someone's interest

• Key ideas: a hash-chain & proof-of-work.

2 Blocks

• The ledger is organized into tx groups called "blocks".

$\underline{tx_0, tx_1, tx_2}$; $\underline{tx_3, tx_4, tx_5}$; ...
Block 1 Block 2

• Blocks are added to the ledger atomically. \swarrow together / all-at-once

• A system may specify a range of acceptable block sizes.

3. Proof-of-Work

- An idea used to:
 - Create money while,
 - Preserving scarcity, and
 - Incentivizing storage / maintenance of ledger.

• We'll:

- Reward anyone who adds a block, but
- make blocks **hard** to add (using crypto).

• A block

• Is added to the ledger by a "miner"

• Contains:

- the miner's public key
- a new coin Id for the miner's reward
- a list of transactions

• hash of previous block (more on this later)

• a "grind": a sequence of bytes that the miner sets arbitrarily (more on this later)

• In addition to the UTXOs of its txs

• A block creates a new UTXO for the miner:

• $id = \text{miner's reward id}$

For example: "1"

• $pk = \text{miner's pk}$

• $amt = \text{REWARD_AMT} + \sum \text{transaction surpluses}$

• So, adding to the ledger gives \$

• How do we preserve scarcity

• By making blocks **hard** to add

• By adding extra constraints

• Requirement: first d ^{integer} bits of $H(\text{block.to.bytes}())$ must be 0.

• Meet this requirement by trying different grinds

• $H(\text{Block}(_, _, \dots, \text{grind} = x). \text{to.bytes}()) = ??$

• "

• "

grind = y ↗ try random
grind = z ↖ values until requirement is met.

Q: If H is like a random fn, what is the prob. that the last d bits are zero?

A: $\Pr[\text{One bit is } 0] = \frac{1}{2}$, so $\frac{1}{2^d}$.


- Thus, the expected # of guessed grind values is 2^d . ↗ "difficulty" parameter: higher → harder to add blocks.

• The idea to require the last d bits of $H(\text{data})$ to be zero is called "proof of work".

• Invented by Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor in '93
↗ also "differential privacy" ↗ RSA '22 Math award




- Invented for stopping email spam:
 - To email someone who doesn't know you you must provide proof-of-work.



- For us:
 - moderates block production rate.
 - randomizes block production authority.
 - distributes block production authority proportionally to computational resources.
- Moderating block production rate:
 - d is raised / lowered to pace out block every 10 minutes.

Total Hash Rate (TH/s)


The estimated number of terahashes per second the bitcoin network is performing in the last 24 hours.




Bitcoin Block Time historical chart

Average block time (minutes)

Share: [Twitter](#) [Reddit](#) [VK](#) [Telegram](#) [Facebook](#) [G+](#)



- Distributing block production authority:
 - Construct a proof-of-work \rightarrow authority to add a block
 - Chance of solving POW \sim # of computers



- So as long as honest people have $> 50\%$ of computers, the system behaves as intended

• "51% Attack": An adversary w/ $> 50\%$ of computers can do many bad things including:


- Refuse the transactions of people they don't like

4 Hash-Chain ("Block Chain")


- Remaining problem: how do we agree upon the order of previous blocks?

- Connect all previous blocks to proof-of-work

- Set "previous hash" field of each block to the hash of last block.



A "block chain"



• Benefits of hash-chaining:

- Establishes a clear order of blocks / transactions
- Ties the PoW to the order
 - new order \rightarrow new PoW
 - Important, because re-ordering txs could be an attack

Example (stocks):

1. Buy 2 shares of JPM for Alice @ \$102

2. Buy 2 shares of JPM for Bob @ \$110

Switching them gives Alice
a worse price!

Sell offers
1 JPM @ 50
1 JPM @ 52
1 JPM @ 53
1 JPM @ 57