<u>CS255</u>: Winter 2010

PRPs and PRFs

1. Abstract ciphers: PRPs and PRFs,

2. Security models for encryption,

3. Analysis of CBC and counter mode

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PRPs and PRFs

Pseudo Random Function (PRF) defined over (K,X,Y):
 F: K × X → Y

such that exists "efficient" algorithm to evaluate F(k,x)

• Pseudo Random Permutation (**PRP**) defined over (K,X): E: $K \times X \rightarrow X$

such that:

1. Exists "efficient" algorithm to evaluate E(k,x)

2. The function $E(k, \cdot)$ is one-to-one

3. Exists "efficient" inversion algorithm D(k,x)

Running example

• Example PRPs: 3DES, AES, ...

AES: $K \times X \to X$ where $K = X = \{0,1\}^{128}$ DES: $K \times X \to X$ where $X = \{0,1\}^{64}$, $K = \{0,1\}^{56}$ 3DES: $K \times X \to X$ where $X = \{0,1\}^{64}$, $K = \{0,1\}^{168}$

• Functionally, any PRP is also a PRF.


- A PRP is a PRF where X=Y and is efficiently invertible.

Secure PRFs

• Let $F: K \times X \rightarrow Y$ be a PRF

 $\begin{cases} \mathsf{Funs}[\mathsf{X},\mathsf{Y}]: & \text{the set of } \underline{all} \text{ functions from } \mathsf{X} \text{ to } \mathsf{Y} \\ \mathsf{S}_{\mathsf{F}} = \{ \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{k},\cdot) \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{k} \in \mathsf{K} \} \subseteq \mathsf{Funs}[\mathsf{X},\mathsf{Y}] \end{cases}$

 <u>Intuition</u>: a PRF is **secure** if a random function in Funs[X,Y] is indistinguishable from a random function in S_F




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
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Secure PRF: defintion


• For b=0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as:



 Def: F is a secure PRF if for all "efficient" A:
 PRF Adv[A,F] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] - Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is "negligible."

Secure PRP

• For b=0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as:



 Def: E is a secure PRP if for all "efficient" A:
 PRP Adv[A,E] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] - Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is "negligible."

Example secure PRPs

• Example secure PRPs: 3DES, AES, ... AES: $K \times X \rightarrow X$ where $K = X = \{0,1\}^{128}$

• <u>AES PRP Assumption</u> (example) :

All 2^{80} —time algs A have PRP Adv[A, **AES**] < 2^{-40}

PRF Switching Lemma

- Any secure PRP is also a secure PRF.
- Lemma: Let E be a PRP over (K,X) Then for any q-query adversary A:
 PRF Adv[A,E] - PRP Adv[A,E] < q² / 2|X|
- \Rightarrow Suppose |X| is large so that $q^2 / 2|X|$ is "negligible"

Then

PRP Adv[A,E] "negligible" \Rightarrow PRF Adv[A,E] "negligible"

Using PRPs and PRFs

- <u>Goal</u>: build "secure" encryption from a PRP.
- Security is always defined using two parameters:
 - What "power" does adversary have? examples:

Adv sees only one ciphertext (one-time key)

Adv sees many PT/CT pairs (many-time key, CPA)

- 2. What "goal" is adversary trying to achieve? examples:
 - Fully decrypt a challenge ciphertext.
 - Learn info about PT from CT (semantic security)


Modes of Operation for One-time Use Key

Example application:

Encrypted email. New key for every message.

Semantic Security for one-time key


- E = (E,D) a cipher defined over (K,M,C)
- For b=0,1 define EXP(b) as:



 Def: E is sem. sec. for one-time key if for all "efficient" A:
 SS Adv[A,E] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] - Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is "negligible."

Semantic security (cont.)


- Sem. Sec. \Rightarrow no "efficient" adversary learns info about PT from a **<u>single</u>** CT.
- Example: suppose efficient A can deduce LSB of PT from CT.
 Then E = (E,D) is not semantically secure.



• Then SS Adv[B, E] = 1 \implies E is not sem. sec.

Note: ECB is not Sem. Sec.


- Electronic Code Book (ECB):
 - Not semantically secure for messages that contain more than one block.



• Then SS Adv[A, ECB] = 1

Secure Constructions

- Examples of sem. sec. systems:
 - 1. SS Adv[A, OTP] = 0 for <u>all</u> A
 - 2. Deterministic counter mode from a PRF F:
 - $E_{\text{DETCTR}}(k,m) =$



• Stream cipher built from PRF (e.g. AES, 3DES)

Det. counter-mode security


• <u>Theorem</u>: For any L>0.

If F is a secure PRF over (K,X,X) then E_{DETCTR} is sem. sec. cipher over (K,X^L,X^L) .

In particular, for any adversary A attacking E_{DETCTR} there exists a PRF adversary B s.t.:

SS Adv[A, E_{DETCTR}] = 2·PRF Adv[B, F]

PRF Adv[B, F] is negligible (since F is a secure PRF) Hence, SS Adv[A, E_{DETCTR}] must be negligible.



b=1: $f \leftarrow Funs[X,X] \implies Pr[EXP(1)=0] = Pr[r=r'] = \frac{1}{2}$

b=0: $f \leftarrow F(k, \cdot) \implies Pr[EXP(0)=0] = \frac{1}{2} \pm \frac{1}{2} \cdot SS Adv[A, E_{DETCTR}]$

Hence, PRF Adv[F, B] = $\frac{1}{2} \cdot SS Adv[A, DETCTR]$


Modes of Operation for Many-time Key

Example applications:

- 1. File systems: Same AES key used to encrypt many files.
- 2. IPsec: Same AES key used to encrypt many packets.

Semantic Security for many-time key


- E = (E,D) a cipher defined over (K,M,C)
- For b=0,1 define EXP(b) as: (simplified CPA)



 Def: E is sem. sec. under CPA if for all "efficient" A:
 SS^{CPA} Adv[A,E] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] - Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is "negligible."


Security for many-time key

- <u>Fact:</u> stream ciphers are insecure under CPA.
 - More generally: if E(k,m) always produces same ciphertext, then cipher is insecure under CPA.



 If secret key is to be used multiple times ⇒ given the same plaintext message twice, the encryption alg. must produce different outputs.


Nonce-based Encryption



- nonce n: a value that changes from msg to msg (k,n) pair <u>never</u> used more than once
- <u>method 1</u>: encryptor picks a random nonce, $n \leftarrow N$
- <u>method 2</u>: nonce is a counter (e.g. packet counter)
 - used when encryptor keeps state from msg to msg
 - if decryptor has same state, need not send nonce with CT

Construction 1: CBC with random nonce

• Cipher block chaining with a <u>random</u> IV (IV = nonce)



CBC: CPA Analysis

• <u>CBC Theorem</u>: For any L>0,

If E is a secure PRP over (K,X) then

 E_{CBC} is a sem. sec. under CPA over (K, X^L, X^{L+1}).

In particular, for a q-query adversary A attacking E_{CBC} there exists a PRP adversary B s.t.:


 $SS_{CPA} \ Adv[A, E_{CBC}] \leq \ 2 \cdot PRP \ Adv[B, E] \ + \ 2 \ q^2 \ L^2 \ / \ |X|$

• Note: CBC is only secure as long as $q^2L^2 \ll |X|$


Construction 1': CBC with unique nonce

• Cipher block chaining with <u>unique</u> IV (IV = nonce)

unique IV means: (k,IV) pair is used for only one message




Construction 2: rand ctr-mode



IV - chosen at random for every message

Construction 2': nonce ctr-mode



rand ctr-mode: CPA analysis

- Randomized counter mode: random IV.
- <u>Counter-mode Theorem</u>: For any L>0, If F is a secure PRF over (K,X,X) then E_{CTR} is a sem. sec. under CPA over (K,X^L,X^{L+1}).

In particular, for a q-query adversary A attacking E_{CTR} there exists a PRF adversary B s.t.:

 $SS_{CPA} \ Adv[A, E_{CTR}] \leq \ 2 \cdot PRF \ Adv[B, F] \ + \ 2 \ q^2 \ L \ / \ |X|$

<u>Note</u>: ctr-mode only secure as long as q²L << |X|
 Better then CBC !

Summary

- PRPs and PRFs: a useful abstraction of block ciphers.
- We examined two security notions:

1. Semantic security against one-time CPA.

2. Semantic security against many-time CPA.

Note: neither mode ensures data integrity.

• Stated security results summarized in the following table:

Power	one-time key	Many-time key	CPA and
Goal		(CPA)	CT integrity
Sem. Sec.	steam-ciphers det. ctr-mode	rand CBC rand ctr-mode	later