In many cases, we want a stronger property: the prover actually "knows" why a statement is true (e.g., it knows a "witness")

For instance, consider the following language:

In this case, all statements in G are true (i.e., contained in C), but we can still consider a notion of proving knowledge of the discrete log of an element h E G — conceptually stronger property than proof of membership

Philosophical question: What does it mean to "know" something?

If a prover is able to convince on honest verifier that it knows something then it should be possible to extract that quantity from the prover.

 $\frac{\text{Definition.}}{\text{extractive proof system }(P,V) \text{ is a proof of knowledge for an } \frac{NP \text{ relation } R \text{ if there easts an efficient}}{\text{proof of knowledge is parameterized by a specific }} \\ \frac{\text{extractor } E \text{ such that for any } x \text{ and any priver } P^{*} \\ Pr[w \in E^{P^{*}}(x) : R(x, w) = 1] \ge Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] - E \\ \\ \frac{\text{more generally,}}{\text{could be poly nomially smaller}} \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] - E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] - E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[\langle P^{*}, V \rangle(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = E \\ \frac{Pr[w = E^{P^{*}}(x) = 1] = Pr[w = E^$

Trivial proof of knowledge: prover sends witness in the clear to the verifier In most applications, we <u>additionally</u> require zero-knowledge

Note: knowledge is a strictly stronger property than soundness

 \rightarrow if protocol has knowledge error $\varepsilon \Rightarrow$ it also has soundness error ε (i.e. a dishonest prover convinces an honest verifier of a false statement with probability at most ε)

$$\frac{Completeness}{g^{z}}: if z = r + cx, then g^{z} = g^{r} + cx = g^{r} g^{cx} = u \cdot h^{c}$$

$$\frac{Zero}{(e.g., view of the honest verifier can be simulated)}$$

Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: build a simulator as follows (familiar strategy: run the protocol in "reverse"):

On input
$$(g,h)$$
:
1. Sample $Z \stackrel{R}{=} Zp$
2. Sample $C \stackrel{R}{=} Zp$
3. set $u = \frac{g^2}{h^c}$ and output (u, c, Z)
uniformly random to the set of th

What goes wrong if the challenge is not sampled uniformly at random (i.e., if the verifier is dishonest) Albove simulation no longer works (since we cannot sample z first)

L> To get general zero-knowledge, we require that the verifier first commit to its challenge (using a statistically hidding committment)

- Knowledge: Suppose P* is (possibly malicious) prover that convinces honest verifier with probability I. We construct an extractor as follows: 1. Run the prover Pt to obtain an initial message U.
 - 2. Send a challenge Ci R Zp to P*. The prover replies with a response Zi.
 - 3. "Rewind" the prover P" so its internal state is the same as it was at the end of Step 1. Then, send another challenge $C_2 \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ to P^* . Let \mathbb{Z}_2 be the response of P^* .
 - 4. Compute and output $X = (Z_1 Z_2)(c_1 c_2)^T \in \mathbb{Z}p$.

Since P* succeeds with probability I and the extractor perfectly simulates the honest vertice's behavior, with probability 1, both (u, c1, 2,) and (u, c_2, z_2) are both accepting transcripts. This means that

Thus, extractor succeeds with <u>overwhelming</u> probability.

(Borch-Shoup, Lemma 19.2)

If P^{*} succeeds with probability \mathcal{E} , then need to rely on "Rewinding Lemma" to argue that octractor obtains two accepting transcripts with probability at least $\mathcal{E}^2 - \frac{1}{p}$.

given
$$(u, t_1, z_1)$$
 and $(u, t_2, z_2)' \Longrightarrow$ can extract the witness

initial challenge [same initial message, different challenges] message


3-message protocols that society completeness, special soundness, and HVZK are called Z-protocols L> Z-protocols are useful for building signatures and identification protocols

How can a prover both prove knowledge and yet be zero-knowledge at the same time?

L> Extractor operates by "rewinding" the prover (if the prover has good success probability, it can answer most challenges correctly. > But in the real (actual) protocol, verifier cannot rewind (i.e., verifier only sees prover on fresh protocol executions), which can provide zero-knowledge.

Many extensions of Schnerr's protocol to prove relations in the exponent.

For example, suppose we want to prove that (g,h,u,v) is a DDH tuple (i.e., Ix EZp : h=gx and v=u?) Chaum-Pedersen:



Completeness : Follows by construction. Special soundness: Suppose we have accepting transcripts $((\alpha,\beta), t_1, z_1)$ and $((\alpha,\beta), t_2, z_2)$ $\frac{g^{z_1}}{g^{z_2}} = \frac{dh^{t_1}}{dh^{t_2}} \implies z_1 - z_2 = \chi(t_1 - t_2) \pmod{p}$ $\implies \chi = (z_1 - z_2)(t_1 - t_2)^{-1}$ Then Similar calculation shows that $v = u^{x}$.

HVZK: Construct simulator as follows: 1. Sample Z Z Zp 2. Sample $t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. 3. Output $(g^2/h^t, v^2/u^t, t, z)$

Since z is uniform and $h=g^{\chi}$, $v=u^{\chi}$, distribution of $(g^2/n^4, u^2/v^4)$ is identically to (g^r, u^r) . Challenge t is identically distributed, which uniquely obtermines z.