By Ender Survin, 
$$\sum_{n \in \mathbb{Z}} f(x) = 4(n) = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}} \hat{\theta}_j(j) = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}} f_j(j)$$
  
Appled 5 p(d), we have  $\sum_{n \in \mathbb{Z}} f_i(n) = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}} f_j(j) = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}} p_{j,i}(j) = 5 \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}} p_{i,i}(j)$   
Princip surphy oth a guidet traplet. Supple as has a data AR+5 (a) (a) A a determinity data to orders).  
Surving parts: Surving from  $D_{2,4,c}$ . (the organise complex:  
) Surving  $x \neq \mathbb{Z}$  or  $[c-5 + 5(n), c-5 + 5(n)]$ . We did not  $4(n) = O((\frac{11}{2}n))$ .  
2) Durpher  $x \neq \mathbb{Z}$  or  $[c-5 + 5(n), c-5 + 5(n)]$ . We did not  $4(n) = O((\frac{11}{2}n))$ .  
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2) Durpher  $x \neq \mathbb{Z}$  or  $[c-5 + 5(n), c-5 + 5(n)]$ .  
3) Theorem of Banday, that  $3 = 2(\frac{1}{2}n) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}e^{\frac{1}{2}n} + \frac{1}{2}(1 + n)(5(n))$   
3) Theorem of D<sub>2,0</sub> (x) with the normal  $[c-5 + 5(n), c-5 + 5(n)]$ .  
3) Constraints, regarding marking adjust the solution  $[c-5 + 5(n), c-5(n)]$ .  
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3) Constraint  $[c-5(n), c-5(n$ 

Proof. Let 
$$\pi_{i}: \mathbf{R}^{i} \rightarrow \text{span}(\mathbf{h},...,\mathbf{h})$$
 be the projection from  $\mathbf{R}^{i}$  and the subspace spanned by  $\mathbf{h}_{i},...,\mathbf{h}_{i}$ .  
We show that  $\forall j \in \{n\}$ :  
 $\mathbf{V} - \mathbf{V}_{j} - \pi_{j}(\mathbf{c}_{j}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{G}_{j}} (2_{i} - C_{i}) \tilde{\mathbf{h}}_{i}$   
For  $j = 0$ , clain is invariable (V=Ve,  $\pi_{e}(\mathbf{c}_{e}) = 0$ ).  
Suppose data hidds for  $j + \mathbf{h} = 1$ . Thus,  
 $\mathbf{V}_{0} - \mathbf{v}_{k} - \pi_{k}(\mathbf{c}_{e}) = \mathbf{V}_{0} + \mathbf{v}_{k+1} + \mathbf{2}_{k}\mathbf{b}_{k} - (\pi_{k-1}(\mathbf{c}_{k}) + \mathbf{c}_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k})$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} + \mathbf{v}_{k-1}) + \mathbf{2}_{k}\mathbf{b}_{k} - (\pi_{k-1}(\mathbf{c}_{k}) + \mathbf{c}_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k})$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} + \mathbf{v}_{k-1}) + \mathbf{2}_{k}\mathbf{b}_{k} - \pi_{k-1}(\mathbf{c}_{k})) - C_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} - \mathbf{v}_{k-1} - \pi_{k-1}(\mathbf{c}_{k-1})) + \mathbf{2}_{k}(\mathbf{b}_{k} - \mathbf{c}_{k-1}(\mathbf{b}_{k})) - C_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} - \mathbf{v}_{k-1} - \mathbf{x}_{k}(\mathbf{c}_{k-1})) + \mathbf{2}_{k}(\mathbf{b}_{k} - \mathbf{c}_{k-1}(\mathbf{b}_{k})) - C_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} - \mathbf{v}_{k-1} - \mathbf{x}_{k}(\mathbf{c}_{k-1})) + \mathbf{2}_{k}(\mathbf{b}_{k} - \mathbf{c}_{k-1}(\mathbf{b}_{k})) - C_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= (\mathbf{v}_{0} - \mathbf{v}_{k-1} - \mathbf{x}_{k}(\mathbf{c}_{k-1})) + \mathbf{2}_{k}(\mathbf{b}_{k} - \mathbf{c}_{k-1}(\mathbf{b}_{k})) - C_{k}^{i}\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= \sum_{i \in \mathbf{b}_{k-1}} (2_{i}-\mathbf{c}_{k})\mathbf{b}_{i} + (\mathbf{a}_{k} - \mathbf{c}_{k})\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= \sum_{i \in \mathbf{b}_{k-1}} (2_{i}-\mathbf{c}_{k})\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= \sum_{i \in \mathbf{b}_{k-1}} (2_{i}-\mathbf{c}_{k-1})\mathbf{b}_{k}$   
 $= \sum_{i \in \mathbf$ 

<u>hearem (Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanothan)</u>. There is an efficient algorithm that takes a basis B ot a lattice L = 2(B), a cose C + L and a Gaussian width parameter S ≥ ||B̃||:w(virgn) and outputs a sample whose distribution is statistically dose to D1,s,c

Proof. Follows by combining above algorithm with sampling algorithm for integers.

The desired distribution can be written as

$$D_{L,s,c}(v) = P_{s,c}(v) \cdot Q^{-1}$$

for some normalization constant Q G TR. By the previous lemma, the algorithm outputs V G L(B) u.p.

Now,  $\mathcal{T}(\mathbb{Z}) \leq \lambda_n(\mathbb{Z}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) = \omega(\log n)$ . When  $S \geq \|\tilde{B}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ , then  $S'_i = \sqrt{\|\tilde{b}'_i\|} \geq \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) = 2$ . Thus,  $\mathcal{P}_{S'_i, C'_i}(\mathbb{Z}) \in [1-\operatorname{negl.}, 1+\operatorname{negl.}] \cdot \mathcal{P}_{S}(\mathbb{Z})$ , which is a quantity that is independent of V and C. Thus, the algorithm outputs V with probability propertional to  $\mathcal{P}_{S,C}(V)$ , as required.

<u>Implication</u>: To sample from D<sub>2,5,c</sub>, need a basis B for L= L(B) where  $\|\tilde{B}\| \leq \frac{S}{\omega(\sqrt{100}n)}$ . Need a short basis to sample preimages.

Next: Sampling discrete Gaussians with a gadget trapdoor.

Suppose AR = G where R is short. Sampling pre-image for A is easy; to solve Ax = y, set  $x = R \cdot G^{-1}(y)$ . To sample a pre-image of A, candidate approach is to sample  $Z \leftarrow D_{L_{y}}^{1}(G)$  and output  $x = R \cdot Z$ .

Since  $G = g^T \otimes In$ , it suffice to sample from  $L_y^1(g^T)$ . Now  $L^1(g^T)$  can be described by the following short basis:  $B = \begin{pmatrix} 2 \\ -1 & 2 \\ -1 & -1 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\pm \times t}$ where  $t = \log q$ 

Observe

 $(1 \ 2 \ 4 \ \cdots \ 2^{\log g}) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 2 \\ -i \\ -i \\ -i \\ -i \\ z \end{pmatrix} = 0 \pmod{g}$  [this is when g is power of two, similar construction possible for non-power of two as well]

Gran-Schnidt norm of this basis is very short:  $\hat{B} = 2In$  so  $\|\hat{B}\| = 2$ . Can use GPV to sample from  $D_{L_u}(gT)$ , s, c. whenever  $s > \sqrt{\omega}(\log n)$ . Procedure is also very simple since  $\hat{B} = 2In$ .

GVW allows us to sample  $x \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^n}$ , such that Gx = y for any  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . What about the distribution of  $\mathbb{R} \cdot x$ . Certainly  $A\mathbb{R} \cdot x = Gx = y$ , but is  $\mathbb{R} \cdot x$  still a discrete Gaussian?

Yes. but discrete Coussian is not spherical. Resulting distribution is discrete Coussian with covariance S<sup>2</sup> RR<sup>T</sup>.





→ Is this problemantic?

<u>Yes</u>: given multiple samples, can estimate covariance and this leaks R (the trapdoor)

Spherical Gaussian centered Distribution after rescaling samples at 0 by [16]

Our goal is spherical discrete Gaussian with righth s (i.e., covariance  $s^2 I_n$ ).

<u>Key approach</u>: Gaussian convolution lemma "Sum of two independent Gaussians is Gaussian" - analog genurally holds for discrete Gaussian over lattices (see [Pe:11]). We can sample x where Ax=y where x is from a Gaussian with covariance  $S^2 RR^T$ To "correct" the distribution, we can sample z where Az=D and z is discrete Gaussian with covariance  $S^2 I - S^2 RR^T$  Given R where AR = G, goal is to sample  $x \sim D_{Z^n,s}$  where Ax = y1. Sample perturbation  $p \in \mathbb{Z}^m$  from discrete Gaussian with covariance  $\hat{S}^2 In - S^2 RR^T$  (and mean 0) 2. Sample  $u \leftarrow D_{Z^n,s_1}$  where Gu = y - Ap [Note: we will need that  $S \gg \hat{S}$  - see analysis below] 3. Output x = p + Ru

 $\frac{\text{Correctness}}{\text{Security}}: A \times = Ap + ARu = Ap + Gu = Ap + y - Ap = y$   $\frac{\text{Security}}{\text{Security}}: Covariance of x is \underbrace{\hat{S}^2 In - \hat{S}^2 RR^T + \hat{S}^2 RR^T}_{p} = \hat{S}^2 In , \text{ which is independent of } Rs \left[ x \sim D_{Z^n} \hat{S} \right]$ 

Can we sample a discrete Gaussian over  $\mathbb{Z}^m$  with covariance  $\hat{S}^2 I_n - \hat{S}^2 R R^T$ ?

Requirement. 3<sup>2</sup> In - S<sup>2</sup> RR<sup>T</sup> is positive definite.

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Note: Using GPV sampling algorithm, we can set s = w(slign) since L<sup>1</sup>(G) has good basis (Gram-Schnidt norm of 2)

$$\left\{y \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m}, x \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(A, R, u, s) : (x, y)\right\}$$

GPV signatures in ROM: GPV signatures in ROM:  $Setup(1^{\lambda}): (A,R) \leftarrow TropGen(1^{\lambda}).$  Set vk = (A, p) and sk = (A,R,s) where  $s, p = \overline{b}(m)$   $Sign(sk, m): Compute y \leftarrow H(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2}^{n}$  and  $output \sigma \leftarrow Sample Pre(A,R, u, s) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2}^{n}$  $Verity(vk, m, \sigma): Check that <math>\|m\| \leq p$  and  $A \cdot \sigma = H(m)$ 

Security reduces to ISIS n,m, g, g. In the security proof, reduction algorithm does not have trapdoor. Will simulate signing queries on in by sampling of ← Sample Gaussian (S), programming H(m) → Ao. This is stutistically close to real signature distribution.