## Functional EncryptionFunctional encryption (FE) enables fine-grained access control of sensitive
data. In an FE scheme, decryption keys are associated with functions.
Decrypting an encryption of a message ## Functional Encryption: Deterministic to Randomized Functions from Simple Assumptions
Abstract:
Functional encryption (FE) enables fine-grained control of sensitive data by allowing users to only compute certain functions for which they have a key. The vast majority of work in FE has focused on deterministic functions, but for several applications such as privacy-aware auditing, differentially-private data release, proxy re-encryption, and more, the functionality of interest is more naturally captured by a randomized function. Recently, Goyal et al. (TCC 2015) initiated a formal study of FE for randomized functionalities with security against malicious encrypters, and gave a selectively secure construction from indistinguishability obfuscation. To date, this is the only construction of FE for randomized functionalities in the public-key setting. This stands in stark contrast to FE for deterministic functions which has been realized from a variety of assumptions. Our key contribution in this work is a generic transformation that converts any general-purpose, public-key FE scheme for deterministic functionalities into one that supports randomized functionalities. Our transformation uses the underlying FE scheme in a black-box way and can be instantiated using very standard number-theoretic assumptions (for instance, the DDH and RSA assumptions suffice). When applied to existing FE constructions, we obtain several adaptively-secure, public-key functional encryption schemes for randomized functionalities with security against malicious encrypters from many different assumptions such as concrete assumptions on multilinear maps, indistinguishability obfuscation, and in the bounded-collusion setting, the existence of public-key encryption, together with standard number-theoretic assumptions. Additionally, we introduce a new, stronger definition for malicious security as the existing one falls short of capturing an important class of correlation attacks. In realizing this definition, our compiler combines ideas from disparate domains like related-key security for pseudorandom functions and deterministic encryption in a novel way. We believe that our techniques could be useful in expanding the scope of new variants of functional encryption (e.g., multi-input, hierarchical, and others) to support randomized functionalities.
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{AW17, author = {Shashank Agrawal and David J. Wu}, title = {Functional Encryption: Deterministic to Randomized Functions from Simple Assumptions}, booktitle = {{EUROCRYPT}}, year = {2017} } ## Access Control Encryption for General Policies from Standard Assumptions
Abstract:
Functional encryption enables fine-grained access to encrypted data. In many scenarios, however, it is important to control not only what users are allowed to read (as provided by traditional functional encryption), but also what users are allowed to send. Recently, Damgård et al. (TCC 2016) introduced a new cryptographic framework called access control encryption (ACE) for restricting information flow within a system in terms of both what users can read as well as what users can write. While a number of access control encryption schemes exist, they either rely on strong assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscation or are restricted to simple families of access control policies. In this work, we give the first ACE scheme for arbitrary policies from standard assumptions. Our construction is generic and can be built from the combination of a digital signature scheme, a predicate encryption scheme, and a (single-key) functional encryption scheme that supports randomized functionalities. All of these primitives can be instantiated from standard assumptions in the plain model, and so, we obtain the first ACE scheme capable of supporting general policies from standard assumptions. One possible instantiation of our construction relies upon standard number-theoretic assumptions (namely, the DDH and RSA assumptions) and standard lattice assumptions (namely, LWE). Finally, we conclude by introducing several extensions to the ACE framework to support dynamic and more fine-grained access control policies.
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{KW17b, author = {Sam Kim and David J. Wu}, title = {Access Control Encryption for General Policies from Standard Assumptions}, booktitle = {{ASIACRYPT}}, year = {2017} } ## Function-Hiding Inner Product Encryption is Practical
Abstract:
In a functional encryption scheme, secret keys are associated with functions and ciphertexts are associated with messages. Given a secret key for a function f and a ciphertext for a message x, a decryptor learns f(x) and nothing else about x. Inner product encryption is a special case of functional encryption where both secret keys and ciphertexts are associated with vectors. The combination of a secret key for a vector x and a ciphertext for a vector y reveal <x,y> and nothing more about y. An inner product encryption scheme is function-hiding if the keys and ciphertexts reveal no additional information about both x and ybeyond their inner product. Recently, Bishop, Jain, and Kowalczyk (Asiacrypt 2015) and Datta, Dutta, and Mukhopadhyay (PKC 2016) showed how to construct function-hiding inner product encryption using asymmetric bilinear maps with security in the standard model. In this work, we reduce the parameter sizes and the run-time complexity of the Asiacrypt 2015 and the PKC 2016 constructions by more than a factor of 2 and 4, respectively. We achieve this efficiency by proving security in the generic group model. We then show how function-hiding inner product encryption directly yields single-key two-input functional encryption for general functions over a small message space, which greatly improves upon the parameter sizes of existing constructions from standard assumptions. We validate the practicality of our encryption scheme by implementing both function-hiding inner product encryption and single-key two-input functional encryption. For example, using our construction, encryption and decryption operations for vectors of length 50 complete in a tenth of a second in a standard desktop environment.
BibTeX:
@misc{KLMMRW16, author = {Sam Kim and Kevin Lewi and Avradip Mandal and Hart Montgomery and Arnab Roy and David J. Wu}, title = {Function-Hiding Inner Product Encryption is Practical}, misc = {Full version available at \url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/440}}, year = {2016} } |